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Abstract  
This explanatory research deductively researches to what extent the 2007 financial crisis has 
led to policy learning in the financial sector in the Netherlands. The financial crisis brought the 
deficiencies of financial regulation and perverse incentives within the sector to the surface. 
Because the financial crisis had not only a devastating effect on the financial sector, but also on 
the real economy and on the solvency of governments, it is important to discover whether policy 
learning out of the crisis took place. This in order to engage in a better understanding of the 
effects of certain policy and make better decisions for future policy. The crisis thus created a 
window that facilitated learning. Ten years after the financial crisis it is time to look back. By 
analysing learning literature, this thesis arrived at six indicators of learning which will be tested 
in the Dutch financial sector by the use process tracing in which literature and interview are 
used to gain in-depth information and knowledge about the learning process.  
 The six indicators used to detect learning in the Dutch financial sector are the quality 
and quantity of policy change and new financial regulation, how tractable the policy problem 
is, whether policy-makers and sector officials recognize that there was policy failure, whether 
these actors take some responsibility for the crisis and whether they practice blame avoidance, 
and lastly whether international financial institutions had a positive influence on these actors 
by providing neutral and new information. The evaluation of each of these indicators help to 
make statements about learning in the financial sector as a result of the financial crisis and help 
to detect whether an overall change in the core beliefs about and within the financial sector is 
perceived. 
 The scope of the research is the Dutch financial sector which includes interviews with 
Dutch financial policy-makers, supervisory authorities, and the three largest Dutch commercial 
banks. The Dutch financial sector was chosen as this case was underrepresented as a research 
topic in relation to the financial crisis and especially in relation to learning out of this crisis. 
The extent to which the Dutch financial sector has been affected by the crisis was relatively 
larger than other European countries due to its large and interwoven financial system. The 
importance of learning as a result of the financial crisis is emphasized for a country with such 
a large financial sector in which the crisis had a strong negative impact. This thesis expects to 
find extensive policy learning in the Netherlands because the financial crisis has likely acted as 
a trigger to rethink policy in this sector and to reconsider core beliefs.  
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 This thesis thus both aims to provide valuable insights on the dynamic forces of policy 
learning in the Dutch financial sector and of policy learning in general. Secondly, it is has a 
societal purpose as policy-makers and sector officials should try to limit and prevent damages 
by financial crises and should be aware of their policy learning, or lack of it. This thesis 
concludes that the evaluation of learning indicators and the evidence of change in the sector 
points undeniable at some learning in the Dutch financial sector as a result of the financial crisis. 
Nevertheless a true enduring alteration of thought about the revision of the core beliefs of a 
policy belief system remains difficult to indicate, hence learning on a secondary level is 
especially the case. Therefore the null hypothesis, that this research finds no policy learning, 
can be rejected.  
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1. Introduction  
The European economy is now recovering from its 2007 financial crisis, which later had 
evolved into an economic and sovereign-debt crisis. Although the sovereign-debt crisis that 
struck the southern European member states the hardest, dominated the European news, the 
Dutch financial sector and economy suffered a great deal from the financial crisis. The 
vulnerability of the Dutch financial sector became apparent. The Netherlands for example had 
the largest consolidated foreign claim of the banking sector at the beginning of the financial 
crisis in the European Union (EU), namely a total of over 300 percent of its Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP).1 This indicates how dependent the Dutch financial sector was on external 
developments. Furthermore in the midst of the crisis in 2008 the Dutch government had to 
nationalise the Dutch part of Fortis/ABN AMRO for 27,96 billion euro2, which is one of the 
biggest commercial banks in the Netherlands, and the SNS Reaal bank for 3,7 billion euros3 in 
2013.4 Because banks were no longer prepared to lend money to each other, relatively healthy 
financial institutions were also in danger. In 2008 the Dutch government provided the financial 
sector with 20 billion euros of financial support.5 In an effort to revitalise cash flows in the 
financial market the Dutch government provided state guarantees for the issuance of medium-
term debt securities by banks, and a total of 200 billion euro’s was made available for this 
procedure in 2008.6 This is just a small sampling of the various forms of state aid for the 
financial sector in the Netherlands due to the crisis.  
The Financial crisis brought the deficiencies of financial regulation to the surface and 
showed how related the financial sector is to the well-being of the economy, and how easy it 
can drag down solvent governments. Furthermore the crisis had illustrated the perverse 
structures of the global financial sector. Hence, it forced policy-makers to rethink their policies 
and regulatory frameworks for this sector. Not only policy-makers had to reconsider their 
practices, also the sector itself and its supervisors needed to go back to the drawing board. 
Questions like how to improve banking supervision and how to prevent banks from needing 
state support were heavily debated. Now, ten years after the start of the crisis, it is the time to 
                                                          
1 Maarten Masselink, Paul van den Noord. “The Global Financial Crisis and its effects on the Netherlands”, ECFIN Country 
Focus, Vol. 6:10, 4 December, (2009), p. 3 
2 A. Meinema. “Staatssteun spekt de staatskas”, NOS, 6 February (2014) 
3 Ibidem.  
4 “Nationalisering Fortis-ABN AMRO en SNS REAAL”, Rijksoverheid, accessed October 18, 2017 
https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/kredietcrisis/aanpak-kredietcrisis-nederland-financiele-sector/nationalisering-
fortis-abn-amro-en-sns-reaal 
5 “Aanpak kredietcrisis Nederland financiële sector”, Rijksoverheid, accessed October 18, 2017 
https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/kredietcrisis/aanpak-kredietcrisis-nederland-financiele-sector 
6 Ibidem. 
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look back and discover whether the crisis has taught policy-makers, supervisors and financial 
institutions to learn from the mistakes the crisis has unveiled. Many journalist write about a re-
run of the same mistakes made in 2007, speak about déjà vu when discussing the financial 
sector and exclaim that the ‘we’ haven’t learned anything.7 While at the same time the enormous 
amount of new and improved regulation made it seem like the sector has in fact changed. A 
major crisis like this is often said to trigger the process of policy learning. And because financial 
crises frequently affect the entire economy and not just the financial sector and have devastating 
consequences for the solvency of governments but also for the bank’s customers in general, one 
would hope that lessons have been learned.8 This thesis provides a scientific analysis of policy 
learning in the Dutch financial sector as a result of the financial crisis with the use of a proper 
learning framework. In order to establish learning in the financial sector in the Netherlands it is 
important to not just look at politicians and policy-makers or civil servants, but to provide an 
image of the entire sector this thesis will include commercial banks and supervisory authorities 
like De Nederlandsche Bank (Dutch Central Bank – DNB) and the Autoriteit Financiële 
Markten (Dutch Authority for the Financial Markets – AFM).  Because of the distorting effects 
of the 2007 financial crisis, it is important and relevant to assess whether the crisis has indeed 
led to policy learning in the sense that financial policy has changed and core beliefs about the 
sector have been altered. Policy learning provides a useful framework to look at the “updating 
of beliefs about key components of policy, based on experiences, analysis, or social 
interaction”9. This thesis thus aims to research to what extent the 2007 financial crisis has led 
to policy learning in the financial sector in the Netherlands. 
  
1.1 Relevance 
The EU financial system has grown immensely in the past couple of decades. Part of this growth 
can be attributed to the single currency and the Economic and Monetary Union. Because of the 
free movement of capital in the internal market the control on capital flows greatly diminished 
and the policies of the European Central Bank (ECB) led to trust and confidence in the solvency 
of EU member states. As stated before, the 2007 financial crisis revealed the mistakes 
                                                          
7 Jochem van Staalduine. “Hebben we dan niets geleerd van de kredietcrisis? Situatie vandaag lijkt op die van 2007”, De 
Volkskrant, 6 november, (2017) 
   Gijs den Brinker. “Déjà vu bij de hausse”, Het Financieele Dagblad, 16 December, (2017) 
   William Wright. “Have we learned our lessons from the financial crisis? Don't bank on it”, The Telegraph, 8 October, 
(2017) 
8 Thomas F. Hellmann, Kevin C. Murdock, Joseph Stiglitz. “Liberalization, Moral Hazard in Banking, and Prudential 
Regulation: Are Capital Requirements Enough?”, The American Economic Review, Vol. 90:1, (2000), p. 147 
9 Radaelli, Claudio M. “Measuring policy learning: regulatory impact assessment in Europe.” Journal of European Public 
Policy, 16:8, (2009), p. 1146 
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previously hidden in the EU financial sector. The size of the Dutch financial sector is one of 
the largest in Europe and is considered large even for international standards. In the beginning 
of the financial crisis, the total size of the Dutch banking sector was over six times larger than 
the country’s GDP, although this has decreased since the crisis, in 2013 the sector still was over 
four times larger than the country’s GDP. Figure 1 illustrates the balance sheet total of the 
Dutch banking sector as a percentage of GDP compared to other EU countries and the EU 
average. It shows that the Dutch banking sector is far above the EU average and one of the 
largest in the EU.10  The size of the financial system and in specific the banking sector makes 
it almost impossible for a government to bail out its own financial sector in case of crises and 
failure. Because of the widespread impact problems in the financial sector can have on a 
country’s economy, sovereign debt status and on other countries, it is crucial to discover 
whether policy-makers and sector officials have learned from mistakes made in order to prevent 
such events from happening in the future.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: DNB, ECB, Eurostat.11  
Note: 2005 shows a break in the series as a result of the transition from local GAAP to the IFRS accounting regime. 
 
A lot of research has focused on discovering the causes of the financial crisis and on providing 
suitable solutions, which will be reviewed in chapter 3, but not much research has focused on 
whether policy learning has actually been the case, hence there remain some gaps in the 
                                                          
10 De Nederlandsche Bank. “Perspective on the structure of the Dutch banking sector”, DNB Study, 18 June , (2015), p. 13 
11 Ibidem. 
Figure 1: Balance sheet total of the Dutch banking sector from a historical and international 
perspective. Quarterly figures; expressed as a percentage of gross domestic product 
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literature.12 While much literature emphasises that crisis often leads to policy learning, 
empirical evidence is still scarce and these articles often lack a proper learning framework, state 
Radaelli13 and Howlett14.  This thesis tries to discover whether the crisis indeed led to the 
expected and necessary policy changes and improvements, and whether policy learning can be 
discovered. There has especially been a lack of literature that takes the Dutch financial sector 
as a case of policy learning, while its financial sector is one of the largest in the EU. Many 
attention in the literature was focused on the Anglo-Saxon countries like Ireland and the U.K. 
because of their large financial sectors and more direct ties toward the American financial 
sector. Furthermore, many research is done on the Baltics States which provides the opportunity 
of a proper most similar systems methodology. When the financial crisis swiftly changed into 
an economic and sovereign debt crisis the southern European PIIGS countries and their 
economic difference with northern European countries, were predominantly researched. The 
Netherlands in relation to the financial sector has been an underexposed research topic. 
Moreover, this thesis researches three levels of learning: macro learning by looking at policy 
level, meso learning by looking at the institutional level (supervisors) and micro level by 
looking at the organizational level (banks), while most articles on learning only focus on one 
of these three types of learning. Birkland for example focusses mostly on learning at the policy 
level, or Raudla et al. who pays only attention to civil servant learning, while Elliott and Carroll 
et al. for example focus on the organizational level only.15 But because banks were often 
presented as the main causers of the financial crisis, it is important to extent the research on 
learning within the sector as well. Thus this research fills both an empirical and theoretical gap 
on policy learning in the financial sector by focusing on the Netherlands and by including all 
three levels of learning. This thesis expects that the crisis has created a momentum to rethink 
financial sector policy. Furthermore, because the country was greatly affected by the financial 
crisis, and the extent of government support to deal with failing banks, this thesis expects to 
                                                          
12 Menno Fenger, Lucia Quaglia. “The Global Financial Crisis in Comparative Perspective: Have Policy-makers “Learned 
their Lessons”?”, Journal of Comparative policy Analysis: Research and Practice, Vol. 18:5, (2015) 
   Ringa Raudla, Egert Juuse, Aleksandrs Cepilovs. “Policy learning from crisis in Financial Regulation and Supervision”, 
paper presented at the CPR General Conference, Oslo, 6-9 September, (2017) 
13 Claudio M. Radaelli. “Measuring policy learning: Regulatory impact assessment in Europe”, Journal of European Public 
Policy, Vol. 16:8, (2009) 
14 M. Howlett. “The lessons of failure: Learning and blame avoidance in public policy-making”, International Political 
Science Review, Vol. 33:5, (2012) 
15 D. Elliott. “The failure of organizational learning from crisis – A matter of life and death?”, Journal of Contingencies and 
Crisis Management, Vol.17, (2009) 
   J.S. Carroll, J.W. Rudolph, S. Hatakeneka. “Learning from experience in high-hazard organizations”, Research In 
Organizational Behaviour, Vol. 24, (2002) 
   Ringa Raudla, Egert Juuse, Aleksandrs Cepilovs. “Policy learning from crisis in Financial Regulation and Supervision”, 
paper presented at the CPR General Conference, Oslo, 6-9 September, (2017) 
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discover policy learning in the Netherlands. Subsequently this research will tell us something 
about the effects of crises on policy learning. 
The objectives of this research are twofold. It aims to extend the knowledge on financial 
regulation in the Netherlands and applies policy learning as a framework, which has been an 
underexposed feature in the financial sector in the Netherlands. Furthermore this research 
provides valuable insights on the dynamic forces of policy learning in the financial sector and 
of policy learning in general. Secondly, it is has a societal purpose as policy-makers should try 
to limit and prevent damages by financial crises. Because the goal of policy learning is the 
improvement of policy outcome, policy-makers and sector officials should be aware of their 
policy learning, or lack of it.16  
In order to answer this research question this thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 
provides the theoretical framework of policy learning which explores different literature on 
learning out of a crisis and provides the indicators of policy learning. Chapter 3 discusses the 
main causes of the financial crisis to illustrate the complexity of the policy field and to 
benchmark the new or updated regulation against. Chapter 4 will discuss the methodology of 
the research. It explains which methods are used and why they are chosen and how policy 
learning is operationalized. Thereafter the thesis continues with the empirical chapters. Chapter 
5 discusses the vast amount of new and updated regulation out of the financial crisis. It not only 
illustrates the quantity of new regulation but also discusses the quality of regulation by looking 
at the where regulation came from, how it was implemented in the Netherlands and whether it 
truly dealt with the causes of the crisis. Chapter 6 provides a review of the indicators of policy 
learning as identified in the theoretical framework. It does so mainly by researching the 
interviews, looking at speeches and debates of EU and Dutch political and financial prominent 
officials, and by gathering secondary evidence out of literature. The final empirical chapter will 
look at changes in core beliefs. It does so by researching the switch of core beliefs within and 
about the sector with a focus on the change from a market-making advocacy coalition towards 
a market-shaping advocacy coalition. Furthermore it discusses what lessons the private and 
public actors drew out of the crisis. Again the interviews provide evidence for this section, 
which are complemented by a research on pre, midst and post crisis coalition agreements. 
Finally, chapter 8 concludes the research and discusses the findings. Furthermore it shows the 
limitations of the chosen methodology and how these issues were tackled. 
 
                                                          
16 Michael Howlett. “The lessons of failure: learning and blame avoidance in public policy-making”, International Political 
Science Review, Vol 33:5, November, (2012), p.540 
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2. Theoretical Framework 
To understand whether policy learning happened as a result of the financial crisis in the financial 
sector in the Netherlands it is important to understand policy learning and discover how learning 
can occur. Much literature illustrates that crises lead to policy learning. Especially after a crisis 
there is a time to reflect and learn.17 When researching the effects of policy learning from crisis, 
most literature looks at bureaucrats and civil servants as they can influence policy decisions and 
agenda-setting, however this thesis will also look at learning in the sector itself. This thesis thus 
researches three levels of learning: macro, meso, and micro learning. This chapter will set out 
the theoretical framework of policy learning, applied to the financial sector, and will discuss 
the most significant characteristics of policy learning and the key definitions.18  
 The first theories about policy learning have been deliberated already in 1966 by Karl 
Deutsch who discussed the role of feedback on policy to enhance government practices.19 Now 
policy learning is more regarded as “a process of updating beliefs about key components of 
policy”20, explains political scientist Claudio Radaelli. These key components of policy can be 
the causes and definitions of a policy problem, how to solve it and what objectives should be 
obtained. Peter May divides these different aspects of a policy problem and identifies two types 
of policy learning. First instrumental policy learning which is about the feasibility and 
practicality of the policy instrument or the way policy is implemented. Social policy learning 
“entails lessons about the social construction of policy problems, the scope of policy, or policy 
goals.”21. May explains that policy change can entail both types of learning. Updating of beliefs 
can be the result of social interaction, for example between political actors, but also the industry. 
The updating of beliefs can also result out of analysis, research and information, states 
Radaelli.22 An important framework used to discuss and explain policy change and learning is 
the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) which was developed by political scientist Paul A. 
Sabatier who specialized in public policy. His definition of policy learning is: “a relatively 
enduring alteration of thought or behavioural intentions that are concerned with the attainment 
                                                          
17 Ringa Raudla, Aleksandrs Cepilovs, Vytautas Kuokštis & Rainer Kattel. “Fiscal Policy Learning from Crisis: Comparative 
Analysis of the Baltic Countries”, Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice, (2016), p.3 
   A.Brandstrom, F. Bynander, P. t’Hart. “Governing by looking back: Historical analogies and crisis management”, Public 
Administration, Vol. 82(1), 2004 
   T. Heikkila, A.K. Gerlak. “Building a conceptual approach to collective learning: Lessons for public policy scholars”, 
Policy Studies Journal, Vol. 41(3), (2013) 
18 Ibidem, p. 343 
19 Karl W. Deutsch, The Nerves of Government, (New York: The Free Press, 1966) 
20 Claudio M. Radaelli. “Measuring policy learning: regulatory impact assessment in Europe”, Journal of European Public 
Policy, Vol. 16(8), December, (2009), p. 1146 
21 Peter J. May. “Policy Learning and Failure”, Journal of Public Policy, Vol.12:4, (1992) 
22 Ibidem, pp. 1145-147 
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(or revision) of the precepts of a policy belief system”23. This framework shows that policy 
learning and policy change often are interrelated. The ACF thus illustrates what factors are 
likely to induce policy change and learning. Figure 2 depicts a flow chart of the general policy 
evolution of the ACF focusing on competing advocacy coalitions within policy subsystems. 
Figure 2: Flow chart of general policy evolution focusing on competing advocacy coalitions within 
policy subsystems. 
Source: Paul A. Sabatier. “Knowledge, Policy-Oriented Learning and Policy Change”, Knowledge, Vol. 8:4, June, (1987), p. 653. 
Traditionally, many political scientist considered policy change to be the product of changes in 
power between groups of actors with different resources, values and interests.24 The ACF 
however takes these traditional aspects of resources, values and interests and integrates them 
with the importance of knowledge, information and policy analysis.25 The framework hence 
focusses on the interplay between advocacy coalitions that compete with each other, within 
policy subsystems in order to understand policy change. The ACF of Sabatier and the concept 
of learning is part of a movement that complements and apposes power as the main explanatory 
variable of policy change, explains Loeber.26 These subsystems in Sabatier’s framework are all 
sorts of private or public organisations that concern themselves with a specific policy issue, 
                                                          
23 P.A. Sabatier, Policy change over a decade or more, 1993, in: P.A. Sabatier, H. Jenkins-Smith (EDS) Policy Change and 
Learning. An advocacy Coalition Approach, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), p. 19 
24 J.Q. Wilson, Political Organizations, (Basic Book, New York, 1973) 
25 Paul A. Sabatier. “Knowledge, Policy-Oriented Learning and Policy Change”, Knowledge, Vol.8:4, June, (1987), p. 681 
26 A.M.C. Loeber. “The learning concept in the policy sciences: not too elusive to be meaningful in practice”, Concepts and 
Methods. Newsletter of the International Political Science Association, Vol.4:1, (2008) 
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which exist in a broader political structure and external surroundings. The actors from these 
different organisations gather into advocacy coalitions as they share the same normative and 
causal beliefs. These coalitions implement strategies aimed at institutional change in order to 
fulfil policy objectives. When these strategies conflict, third-party mediators, or policy brokers 
as Sabatier calls them, help to find reasonable compromises and diminish conflict. This results 
in action programmes, set up by the government that produces policy outputs. Coalitions can 
revise their strategies or change beliefs as a reaction to various events. This can for example be 
caused by the perceived competence and adequacy of the government, it can be based on new 
information, it can be because of external dynamics (like a crisis) etc. Sabatier explains that 
“the integration of this knowledge with the basic values and causal assumptions comprising the 
core beliefs of advocacy coalitions is the focus of policy learning”27, and this learning can be 
considered a driving force behind policy change.28  
 The framework shows various external factors that can affect policy change within a 
subsystem. The first are “relatively stable parameters29” and the second are “those [external] 
aspects of the system which are susceptible to significant fluctuations over the course of a few 
years”30. According to the ACF, policy change can result out of several dynamics. First of all, 
policy subsystems can translate their core beliefs into governmental action programs. Within 
these subsystems both dominant and minority coalitions will try to realize their policy 
objectives over time by increasing their resources and through policy learning. Secondly, policy 
change can be a product of processes of external disturbances, like changes in socioeconomic 
conditions, effects of systemic event and more. In the case of this research, this systemic event 
is the financial crisis and the resulting changes in socioeconomic conditions in the Netherlands. 
Events can stimulate a coalition to re-examine its core beliefs as it goes together with the 
realization that current policy has failed. This can pave the way for other coalitions to 
demonstrate that their beliefs may be better suited for a specific policy problem. A major event 
thus does not only cause external disturbances, it should also be effectively exploited by a 
coalition whose ideas are better suitable to deal with the issue.31  
These events and dynamics can lead to the re-examination of a core belief, however 
actors are in general reluctant to change their core beliefs, therefore learning will most likely 
                                                          
27 Paul A. Sabatier. “Knowledge, Policy-Oriented Learning and Policy Change”, Knowledge, Vol.8:4, June, (1987), p. 654 
28 Ibidem, pp. 652 - 654 
29 Ibidem, p. 655 
30 Ibidem, p. 655 
31 Ibidem, pp. 649-692 
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happen in the secondary aspects of their belief system. Nevertheless coalitions in policy 
subsystems can partake in policy learning when the beliefs of another coalition are too 
important and significant to ignore.32 Furthermore dissatisfaction with the performance of a 
certain policy, in terms of its output or lack of ability to properly deal with a problem, can also 
incentivize actors to re-examine their strategies and beliefs. However, Sabatier emphasises that 
learning from experiences is very difficult in a complex world where “performance gaps are 
difficult to measure, well-developed causal theories are often lacking, where controlled 
experiments are virtually impossible, and opponents are doing everything possible to muddle 
the situation and otherwise to impede one from learning”33. Another source of leaning and 
changes in (core) beliefs can be research and information. New information can challenge the 
accepted knowledge and beliefs, and can change the way actors perceive the causes of a policy 
problem. This often results in analytical debates where actors try to convince others of the 
soundness of their positions and policy solutions. In order to increase the probability of policy-
oriented learning it is important for policy problems to be analytical tractable. Sabatier explains 
that policy problems which include accepted quantitative performance indicators, are much 
more susceptible to learning than problems in more subjective settings.34  
 In conclusion, Sabatier’s framework of policy-oriented learning is focused on ideas. 
However these core beliefs are difficult to change. Sabatier thus focuses on the so called 
secondary aspects of a belief system, which are about the types of strategies and instruments 
used to achieve and implement those core beliefs.35 According to Sabatier, “policy-oriented 
learning […] is an ongoing process of search and adaptation motivated by the desire to realize 
core policy beliefs”36. Hence, policy-oriented learning according the ACF involves three 
processes: 
(1) “Improving one's understanding of the state of variables defined as important by one's 
belief system (or, secondarily, by competing belief systems).”  
(2) “Refining one's understanding of logical and causal relationships internal to a belief 
system.” 
                                                          
32 Jenkins-Smith, H., and P. Sabatier, “The Dynamics of Policy-Oriented Learning.”, in Policy Change and Learning: An 
Advocacy Coalition Approach, P. Sabatier and H. Jenkins-Smith (eds), (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993), pp.41–56 
33 Paul A. Sabatier. “Knowledge, Policy-Oriented Learning and Policy Change”, Knowledge, Vol.8:4, June, (1987), p. 675 
34 Ibidem 
35 Paul A. Sabatier. “An advocacy coalition framework of policy change and the role of policy-oriented learning therein”, 
Policy Sciences, Vol. 21, (1988), pp. 144-146 
36 Ibidem, p. 151 
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(3) “Identifying and responding to challenges to one's belief system.”37 
One final crucial recommendation of Sabatier when discussing policy learning in the ACF is to 
consider at least a decade to follow or look back on policy learning and change. This is 
important as policies remain quite stable for longer periods of time and within a decade it is 
likely that a full policy cycle has passed. This research looks at changes and learning in policy 
and regulation from 2007 (beginning of the crisis) until 2017, or a decade after.  
The concept of policy learning is also closely related to drawing lessons, as lessons 
establish what has been learned. Political scientist Richard Rose stated that a lesson in the area 
of policy making is “knowledge that is instructive a conclusion about a subject drawn after the 
fact from observation or experience. […] defined as an action oriented conclusion about a 
programme or programmes in operation elsewhere […] A lesson is more than an evaluation of 
a programme in its own context; it also implies a judgement about doing the same elsewhere.”38. 
As Rose puts it, policy-makers take both negative and positive experiences of others who deal 
with the same type of common problems and use these experiences to learn. Here, Rose takes 
an approach of learning across policy areas as policy-makers, according to him, look at 
colleagues in other cities for example to learn from their experiences. Sabatier on the other hand 
focuses his theories more on within policy area learning.39 Evaluations of existing policy 
programmes and looking at others and how they dealt with policy issues thus consist of an 
important part of policy learning, according to Rose.40 This notion is also supported by political 
scientist Peter Biegelbauer who defines learning as “the production of policy-relevant 
knowledge, skills or attitudes, which are the result of the assessment of past, present or possible 
future policies.”41. According to Biegelbauer, the reason why actors are engaged in learning is 
because it is part of trying to “make sense of the world they live in, to gain a better 
understanding of the effects of their policies and to arrive at better decisions in the future42”. 
Thus the past is reflected on by different actors and this is used to improve decision-making 
about the policy area in the future. The evaluation of the past and other policy areas receive 
more emphasis in the theories of Rose and Biegelbauer than in the ACF of Sabatier.  
                                                          
37 Ibidem, pp. 149 - 151 
38 Richard Rose. “What is lesson-drawing?”, Journal of Public Policy, Vol. 11:1, January, (1991), p. 7 
39 A. Loeber. “The learning concept in the policy sciences: not too elusive to be meaningful in practice”, Concepts and 
Methods. Newsletter of the International Political Science Association, Vol. 4:1, (2008) 
40 Richard Rose. “What is lesson-drawing?”, Journal of Public Policy, Vol. 11:1, January, (1991), pp. 3-30 
41 Peter Biegelbauer. “Learning from abroad: the Austrian Competence Centre Programme Kplus”, Science and Public 
Policy, Vol. 34:9, (2007), p.607 
42 Ibidem  
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2.1 Policy learning out of crisis 
A crisis, or a focusing event is “a sudden, attention-grabbing event”43 that is likely to lead to 
policy change and learning as they attract attention from the general public, including the press, 
and facilitate the search for solutions, explains political scientist Thomas Birkland.44 A crisis 
provides the opportunity to recognize policy failure and thus has the notion of a wake-up call 
and provides a window of opportunity for learning.45 Although a crisis is often defined by its 
unpredictability, low probability, suddenness and high impact, their essential characteristic is, 
according to Pauchant and Mitroff, their ability to challenge core assumptions and practices in 
a certain policy field.46 This is because of the notion that these events create opportunities for 
“politically disadvantaged groups to champion messages that had been effectively suppressed 
by dominant groups and advocacy coalitions. Such events can therefore be an important tool 
for groups seeking policy change.”47. In this example the dominant advocacy coalition in the 
financial sector was the neo-liberal ideology and the suppressed message was a critical note on 
neo-liberalism and capitalism in the financial sector. Because crises are often regarded as 
unacceptable, actors are motivated to prevent future crises from happing, although sometimes 
this might be related to preventing a loss of face. Nevertheless there is a general sentiment that 
“any failure to learn appears reprehensible”48. A strong motive for learning is thus the notion 
of preventing the recurrence of such a crisis, especially when a crisis was rather severe.49 
 During a crisis it is difficult for actors to learn as their main focus lies on crisis 
management. Because of the urgent attention a crisis requires, it actually first constraints policy 
learning, explain Boin and Zahariadis.50 In the midst of the financial crisis banks needed to be 
rescued sometimes within a timeframe of only a weekend. In the aftermath of a crisis however 
it is possible to distinguish different causes of the crisis and possibilities arise to analyse those 
                                                          
43 Thomas A. Birkland. “Focusing Events, Mobilization, and Agenda Setting”, Journal of Public Policy, Vol. 18: 1, (1998),p. 
53 
44 Ibidem, p. 342 
45 J. Hogan, D. Doyle. “The importance of ideas: An a priori critical juncture framework”, Canadian Journal of Political 
Science, Vol. 40:4, (2007) 
    Peter A. Hall. “Policy Paradigms, Social Learning and the State: The Case of Economic Policy-Making in Britain” 
Comparative Politics, Vol. 25:3, (1993) 
46 Pauchant, T., Mitroff, I. “Transforming the crisis-prone organization”, (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1992) 
47 Thomas A. Birkland. “Focusing Events, Mobilization, and Agenda Setting”, Journal of Public Policy, Vol. 18: 1, (1998),p. 
53 
48 Dominic Elliott and Allan Macpherson. “Policy and Practice: Recursive Learning From Crisis”, Group & Organization 
Management, Vol. 35:5, (2010), p. 574 
49 Annika Brändstorm, Frederik Bynander, Paul ’t Hart. “Governing by looking back; Historical analogies and crisis 
management”, Public Administration, Vol. 82:1, (2004) 
50 Nikolaos Zahariadis. “Powering or Puzzling? Downsizing the public sector during the Greek sovereign debt crisis”, 
Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice, Vol 18:5, (2016), p.464 
   Boin, A., ‘t Hart, P., Stern, E. and Sundelius, B., The Politics of Crisis Management, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2005), pp. 18-22 
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causes. Therefore Sabatier recommends to wait at least a decade before analysing learning and 
policy change. When a crisis requires less urgent attention, Zahariadis calls it “the perfect 
environment for analysing the effectiveness of rival ideas and policy tools”51. Crises thus 
present the opportunity to subvert existing policy ideas and create an atmosphere of debate, 
dialogue and reflection. These characteristics of crisis learning are amplified by the fact that the 
crisis situation also takes over the focus of the public and the media. The media provides 
interpretations of what happened during a crisis and highlights certain aspects. This further 
scrutinizes the way in which actors (both political and sectoral actors) have to deal with crisis 
situations and influences their learning.52 Hence crisis are believed to speed up the learning 
process, states political scientist Eric Stern who specialises in crisis management and learning.53  
 However, not all existing literature identifies learning out of crisis, and some authors, 
like Heikkila and Gerlak54 and Ostrom55, emphasise that a crisis will not necessarily lead to 
policy change and learning. Heikkila and Gerlak found that because crises are external events, 
they can also create a hostile environment in which the inclusion and translation of new 
information is obstructed. This hostile environment can be created by the rising uncertainty 
about a topic that accompanies a crisis. Furthermore rapid changes can form a threat to 
institutional stability, states Ostrom56, which in turn can obstruct the social dynamics that are 
needed for learning. Hence learning is not a natural result of a crisis. A crisis both has the ability 
to obstruct or facilitate learning. 
 
2.3 Measuring policy learning 
The concepts of among others Radaelli, Sabatier, and Rose provided a beginning to establish 
what policy learning entails, however it is important to discuss next how to measure policy 
learning in order to make it operational. The first expression of policy learning this thesis 
discusses is policy change, as policy learning logically often leads to policy change. The basic 
idea behind this notion is that policy-makers learn from experiences and hence adjust current 
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policy on the basis of their interpretation of previous policies.57 Elliott and Macpherson 
emphasise in their article ‘Policy and Practice: Recursive Learning From Crisis’ that learning 
may become institutionalised through policy change. Furthermore they distinguish between 
passive and active learning to the example of Toft and Reynolds’ 1997 ‘Learning from 
disasters’58.59 They distinguish a difference in identifying lessons and acting upon those lessons. 
Subsequently it is important that these lessons are not only acted upon but also must be 
translated into appropriate practices. Thus the quality of new or improved regulation must be 
taken into account. Hence policy change is an indicator of active learning out of crisis. Policy 
change as an important part of policy learning is also reflected in the theory of Sabatier who 
argues that policy-oriented learning determines policy innovation and change, which also is a 
major part of his definition of policy-oriented learning. Because policy change is regarded as 
evidence for learning it is important to look at policy change. However if policy change is 
imposed by foreign pressure, like the EU for example, than the level of learning diminishes.60 
Some authors focus more on a better understanding of the world when talking about policy 
learning. When this is the angle, policy change does not necessarily have to be present when 
discovering policy learning.61 However policy change is a good indicator of learning and is 
therefore included in this thesis. In the article ‘Fiscal Policy Learning from Crisis: Comparative 
Analysis of the Baltic Countries’62 by Raudla, Cepilovs, Kuokštis and Kattel, the authors have 
chosen to intensively examine three comparable cases, and qualitatively explore policy learning 
among civil servants. They illustrate what factors influence policy learning in these countries 
and they look at whether these civil servants have changed their policy beliefs.63 Based on 
existing literature the authors distinguish several factors that “influence whether the experience 
of a crisis leads to policy learning by civil servants”64. These factors are: 
(1) Firstly, in accordance to the ACF of Sabatier, a clearly tractable policy problem 
makes it easier to measure performance indicators and to expose the causal 
                                                          
57 Colin J. Bennett, Michael Howlett. “The lessons of learning: Reconciling theories of policy learning and policy change”, 
Policy Sciences, Vol. 25, (1992), p. 276 
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relationship between a problem, its causes and the solution. When this is clearer, it 
is easier to draw lessons and experience policy learning.  
(2) Secondly, when policy actors identify policy failure it is easier to engage in learning. 
If civil servants recognize that the existing policy and regulation is (partly) 
responsible for a crisis, there are more incentives to learn and to reconsider policy. 
(3) Civil servants however often try to avoid responsibility and blame and thus try to 
shift blame to either other agencies or to the industry itself. When these officials are 
highly engaged in blame-avoidance, the opportunities for learning will be greatly 
diminished.   
(4) A fourth factor that determines learning is also related to whether civil servants feel 
responsible or not. If they feel like they could have prevented a crisis, they will be 
more prone to drawing lessons and learn to prevent future crisis.  
(5) A final indicator that influences the possibility of learning from a crisis is the 
influence of external actors. International organizations like the, the IMF, the EU 
and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development can induce 
learning by offering new research and information and by providing a neutral 
analysis and view to the issues at hand.65  
Blame avoidance is often present in politics and policy making, but can also be identified in 
private organisations. Blame avoidance is often indicated with politicians who try to avoid the 
blame of policy failure and try to claim the credits for policy success. This works in direct link 
with voters. Voters or citizens vice versa choose to either blame or praise the one who is 
responsible for a policy outcome. This can also work in the direction towards a financial 
institution. Blame avoidance is central to politics and policy. Hood explains that policy 
behaviour is motivated by “the desire of decision-makers and implementers to emulate positive 
exemplars of successful policies and avoid negative exemplars of failed ones in a process of 
risk or 'blame avoidance'.”66. Three ways are identified in which politicians can manage blame. 
First, politicians can use presentational strategies by selecting specific arguments or create an 
impression that diminishes blame or avoids it all together. Second is by the selection of a policy 
position to avoid blame and the final way is to avoid blame via an agency or other institutional 
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arrangements that have been made responsible for a certain policy field.67 In the case of the 
financial sector the government has delegated the power to supervise and control financial 
institutions to DNB and AFM. In case of the full ‘blame game’ all three indicators would be at 
play, however this is not necessary to identify blame avoidance.68  
The notion of policy learning as this “process of updating beliefs about key components 
of policy”69 emphasises the importance of ideas and beliefs within policy learning. Different 
opinions about causes and definitions of a certain policy problem, require different solutions 
and can lead to policy change. The numerous different ways to define what the problem truly 
is compete with one another in policy subsystems, and a crisis has the ability to shift the 
dominance of ideas. In conclusion, policy learning happens best when policy change is not 
imposed by a higher level of governance and truly reflects the problems at hand, when the 
policy problem is clearly tractable, when policy failure is identified, when responsibility and 
blame are not avoided, and when external actors bring new and neutral information to the table.  
Because this thesis is also interested in the causal inferences of policy learning, figure 3 
illustrates the overview of the causal mechanism of policy learning.  
 
Figure 3: Overview causal mechanism policy learning 
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3. The financial crisis 
Learning can happen when new knowledge and causal assumptions are being integrated into 
core beliefs. It is thus important to assess the causal assumptions about the crisis. The literature 
identifies several causes of the 2007 financial crisis. Economist James Crotty points to the 
ideological shift from strict financial regulation under the theories of Keynes and Minsky in the 
1930’s towards a heavy deregulation in the 1980’s as a reaction to efficient financial market 
theory, also known as New Financial Architecture (NFA).70 Subsequently he points at the 
flawed institutions as the main cause of the crisis. Economist Brad for example states that the 
crisis was a result of certain regulatory actions and inactions that created a sector in which 
“excessive risk taking among banks and bank-like institutions was encouraged, particularly in 
the mortgage-backed security market”71. He identifies seven primary causes of the financial 
crisis that originated in the United States, which worked together like a ‘perfect storm’ and 
resulted in one of the biggest financial crisis of the century. Among these causes for example 
are the securitization of mortgages, regulatory arbitrage, the rise of the shadow financial sector, 
the large amounts of leverage of financial institutions and the low interest rates. Although the 
crisis originated in the United States, these causes largely reflect flaws in the international 
financial sector, and were also present in Europe. Vítor Constâncio, Vice President of the ECB, 
has called the crisis a “clear case of the materialisation and propagation of systemic risk”72, 
pointing out the amount of risks the financial system took and the degree of systemic 
interconnectedness that characterised the financial system. However the multitude of literature 
and causes forces us to make a selection and look at the most important ones. Hence this section 
of the thesis (briefly) discusses the causes of the financial crisis and explains how the crisis 
crossed over towards the EU and the Netherlands in specific.  
 
(1) Mortgage securitization 
An important trend in the pre-crisis period was the increasing housing prices in the U.S. These 
housing prices were fuelled by anticipated capital gains in the housing market and by public 
policies promoting home ownership. U.S. monetary policy have kept the interest rates 
purposefully low for too long. This created a climate in which investors and banks have 
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generated an excessive preference for risks, explains Han de Jong ABN AMRO’s Chief 
Economist.73 Hence, mortgages to buy houses were often extended to people with low credit 
ratings, who actually weren’t in the financial position to take on these loans. Furthermore home 
owners back then only had to put in two percent of their own money into the total costs of their 
house, which was a historic low.74 This tendency was widespread in the U.S. financial market 
and these mortgages were hence issued in the so-called subprime market. Another trend with 
these mortgages was that financial institutions were increasingly securitising their loans, which 
means the bundling, dividing and selling these loans to other financial institutions.75 Big 
financial institutions like Fannie Mae in the United States started to bundle loans together that 
were backed by mortgages. These Mortgage-backed securities (MBS) were then sold in order 
to pass the risk on to the buyers. Which reduced the interest rates on mortgages. Then these 
financial institutions insured these bundled loans against default through credit default swaps 
(CDS). These CDS ensured that in the case of a default, the buyer would receive the face value 
of a bond or loan from the seller. But the insurance market for bonds and thus for CDS was 
largely unregulated.76 This re-packaging, pooling and re-selling of loans and securities also lead 
to a serious mispricing of risk. These securitised loans were largely sold to non-bank financial 
institutions, making the risks even more widespread.77 When the housing bubble burst and the 
amount of debt was higher than the value of the borrower’s home, many borrowers defaulted 
on their loans, which caused a domino effect to other financial institutions. 
 
(2) Rise of the shadow banking sector 
Another increasing trend in the financial sector was the rise of a shadow banking system. The 
market for MBS was also part of this shadow sector.78 This trend shifted firms away from 
regulated activities in the traditional intermediaries towards unregulated and largely 
unsupervised activities.79 The rise of this shadow banking sector had several consequences. 
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First a lot of the intermediaries were now no longer subject to capital requirements. Furthermore 
not all institutions fell under the lender of last resort services of the Federal Reserve, making 
them more susceptible for runs. Because of the lack of regulation in this part of the sector, many 
shadow institutions were vague and secretive about their assets and liabilities and what they 
consisted of.80 This resulted in even more insecurities in the sector once the crisis hit.  
 
(3) Too high leverage rates.  
Financial institutions, and in particular investment banks, borrowed money at quite low interest 
rates. This meant that those banks could easy increase their profits and they did so by leveraging 
and buying more MBS. Brad illustrates that “some investment banks were borrowing $30 for 
every $1 they had in investor capital”81. This shows a leverage ratio of 30:1 (every euro in 
capital is related to thirty euro’s in debt), while in 2004 these banks had to limit their leverage 
ratio’s to 15:1. The European banking sector had on average a liability-capital ratio of 20:1 in 
2010, with leveraging ratios ascending to 50 or even more.82 This also contributed to the fact 
that many banks were too big to fail, or too big to be bailed out by their governments. This was 
aggravated by the low interest rates, set by the Federal Reserve, in the years prior to the crisis 
which resulted in cheap borrowing for both banks and homebuyers.83 Normally this might have 
led to economic growth but because of perverse incentives in the financial sector the money 
was mostly used in speculative investments as financial risk-taking proved to be profitable. 
Hence it did not really fuel the real economy as growth was mostly sustained on debt.  
 
(4) Flawed financial institutions and regulation 
The pre-crisis NFA was based on very light regulation of financial institutions. Especially the 
shadow banking system was hardly regulated. According to Crotty this is a result of neoclassical 
financial economics that beliefs that capital markets are able to price securities correctly and 
buyers would make the best possible decisions about their competences of managing risk. This 
is however not empirically supported and provides thus an unrealistic view on the future and 
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an unrealistic basis to build a financial sector on, states Crotty.84 This trend of scarce regulation 
has also been deployed in Europe where the control on capital flows diminished by the creation 
of the European internal market on capital.85 The NFA also gave rise to regulatory arbitrage, 
which occurs when financial institutions undermine regulation and look for loopholes in the 
law with a main objective of increasing profit. This was especially the case in the shadow 
banking system. Deregulation for example allowed multinational banks to become extremely 
large and complex, making it very difficult to correctly evaluate their risks. The Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS) allowed these banks to assess their own risk and they were thus 
able to set their own capital requirements. Financial institutions use the statistical programme 
Value at Risk (VAR) based on historical data to evaluate their risk. Because this programme is 
based on historical data, it is not an appropriate method to assess current risks as boom periods 
can be followed quickly by periods of higher default. In booming periods banks need a lower 
amount of capital to cover risks than in high default periods. Furthermore this method fails to 
predict these almost once in a lifetime rare situations that are outliers of the normal course of 
events. Thus, risk is often much higher in real life than the estimations coming from VAR.86 
Capital requirements are necessary as they internalize the consequences of taking risks by banks 
and thus forces them to make more prudent choices when investing. It hence deals with some 
of the moral hazard financial institutions face.87 Proper regulation on risk calculations and 
capital requirements lacked and failed to deal with the risks associated with the crisis.88 
 
(5) Insufficient liquidity 
Another problematic issue was the lack of sufficient liquidity in financial institutions. This was 
also related to underestimation of risk with the VAR and the related lower capital requirements. 
In many western countries, up until the end of the 1960’s banks were required to hold 25% of 
their assets in so called real liquid assets. These real liquid assets are assets that can be converted 
into cash quite quickly by selling them in open markets and have a limited impact on the price.89 
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However there has been a systemic decline in the amount of real liquid assets banks hold in 
stock. These have mostly been replaced by different holdings of private sector assets like 
mortgages. As the liquidity declined, banks had had to rely more and more on their central 
banks to solve a shortage of liquidity. If central banks always bail out commercial banks from 
liquidity problems, there is not much incentive to change behaviour, which feeds the moral 
hazard problem of financial institutions.90 When financial institutions get into liquidity 
problems, their solvability eventually might be at stake as well. The decline in both liquid assets 
and capital requirements made the financial sector unequipped to deal with shocks.  
 
(6) Perverse incentives 
The way the financial sector was set up created perverse incentives that encouraged employees 
from financial institutions to take excessive risk. An important example, which was also often 
mentioned in the media, were the excessively high bonuses traders and executives of mostly 
investment banks received when generating high revenues. These profits are maximised by 
taking high risk through leveraging. Crotty gives the example of “Wall Street’s top traders who 
received bonuses of up to $50 million that year. In spite of the investment bank disasters of the 
second half of 2007, which saw Wall Street investment banks lose over $11 billion, the average 
bonus only fell 4.7%”91. Which illustrates that even during a crisis period, employees of 
financial institutions continued to receive these excessive bonuses which continuously gave the 
incentive to pursue high risks.  Another source of perverse incentives is the fact that the growth 
of mortgage securitisation, including its pooling, repackaging and reselling, generated a fee 
income. The advantage of a fee income is that is doesn’t have to be paid back in case of losses 
of these securities. Thus the profits were for the bankers, but the losses were not borne by them. 
Hence there was no incentive to stop the stream of unsound securities and loans as banks and 
mortgage brokers made a lot of money of them.92   
 Another part of the financial sector where perverse incentives played an important role 
were credit rating agencies. An example that Brad illustrates is the skewed relation and the 
conflict of interest between credit rating agencies and firms seeking credit rating. Financial 
institutions were required to hold triple A statuses given by one of the major credit rating 
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agencies. Because of the large demand for triple A statuses, these rating agencies were paid by 
the firms to give them the required ratings.93 These overly generous ratings were exacerbated 
by the strong competition between the rating firms. Furthermore the ratings of these credit 
rating agencies were often misunderstood. These rating agencies only rate the credit default risk 
of a certain asset, however many lenders thought these ratings covered the market and liquidity 
risk too. Certain assets with triple A ratings looked like they were the same quality risks as 
triple A government bonds, while in fact they weren’t.94 Crotty even goes as far by stating that: 
“the recent global financial boom and crisis might not have occurred if perverse incentives had 
not induced credit rating agencies to give absurdly high ratings to illiquid, non-transparent, 
structured financial products such as MBSs and collateralized loan obligations”95.  
 
(7) Miss-pricing of risk 
Already in early 2007 most central banks warned for the serious miss-pricing of risk. The 
difference in safe and risky assets were hardly noticeable. The low interests, the high leveraging 
and high volatility in the market all contributed to the disproportionate under-pricing of risks.96 
This went hand in hand with financial innovation and the increasing complexity of the sector. 
Because these financial products were extremely technical and complex, they became 
inherently non-transparent, while transparency and correct prices are crucial for the working of 
an efficient market. 97 This also supports Crotty’s point that the NFA does not provide a solid 
basis for the financial sector as risk is not priced optimally which causes the market to be 
inefficient. In his article ‘Causes of the global financial crisis’ Crotty cites a suiting quote of 
senior capital market analyst for the Financial Times Gillian Tett; “Innovation became so 
intense that it outran the comprehension of most ordinary banker – not to mention regulators. 
As a result, not only is the financial system plagued with losses on a scale that nobody foresaw, 
but the pillars of faith on which this new financial capitalism were built have all but 
collapsed”98.  
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The several causes this chapter mentioned have contributed to the perfect storm that became 
the financial crisis. The interaction of deregulation with the globalisation of financial markets, 
together with fast financial innovation to the extent that employees of the financial sector did 
not understand the products anymore led to this disturbing financial crisis, explains Crotty.99 
He also points at the various government bailouts which created a strong moral hazard problem 
within the financial sector. Brad emphasised the fact that people who were bad risks were able 
to get loans which was the result of low interest rates, the lack of regulation and the push of the 
U.S. government for people to become home-owners. Because banks were able to make money 
of these MBSs and they were able to sell and repack these loans to avoid the risk, there weren’t 
much incentives in the system to stop this risky behaviour. Investment banks were borrowing 
more money in order to use this on speculations on MBS. This together with the low interest 
rates and government encouragement of home-ownership resulted in the housing bubble. The 
housing bubble slowly started to deflate when the interest rates rose again and people were left 
with debts higher than the value of their houses. When the price of a house is lower than the 
value of the mortgage, there is a strong economic incentive for the one who pays the mortgage 
to ‘give the house back’ to the one who loaned the money, in this case the bank. This is what 
happened in the US. What might looked like a perfect storm is described by others as a “classic 
bank crisis of over-lending, but this time on a global scale”100.101  
MBS began to fail and defaults began to rise. The insurers of these MBS, like Fannie 
Mae, had to seek bailouts from the government. Because of the declining value of MBSs and 
subprime loans, many financial institutions became insolvent. As the housing bubble deflated, 
MBS became less valuable, furthermore because of the extensive sales of MBS it was unclear 
who owned them, what they were worth and how widespread the risk was. At that point the 
financial sector was no longer dealing with risk, but with uncertainty. Therefore the demand for 
low risk quality assets, like for example government bonds, increased and consequently interest 
rates on these assets fell. While “the three-month LIBOR rate (London Inter-Bank Offer Rate: 
the interest rate banks charge each other for three-month loans), rose from 2.8% in mid-
September 2008 to over 4.8% in mid-October of 2008”102, a high raise for only one month. The 
higher interest rates and the insecurity of financial institutions made lending for businesses 
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increasingly difficult and the capital market ‘dried up’. The Federal Reserve first reacted by 
decreasing the interest rates in order to increase the money supply. However more 
unconventional measures, like buying MBS and lending to investment banks, were needed to 
restore the financial sector.103  
The seven causes of the financial crisis discussed here illustrate practices that led to 
default of securities and to the failing of several financial institutions, but what made this crisis 
so problematic was its systemic character. The sheer size and interconnectedness of the 
financial sector throughout western countries was enormous and so were the consequences. The 
financial distress in the United States associated with the collapse of subprime mortgages and 
several securitized products have resulted in major losses in the European financial sector and 
have subsequently resulted in a decrease of lending to businesses and consumers in the EU, a 
geographical area that was seemingly uncorrelated to the origins of the initial financial shock.104 
The interconnectedness of banks and financial institutions ensured the contagion of European 
banks. Contagion here “refers to a situation whereby instability in a specific market or 
institution is transmitted to one or several other markets or institutions”105. Contagion is an 
important mechanism which causes financial instability to become widespread and reach a 
systemic dimension. The imprudent behaviour of financial institutions is hence exacerbated by 
contagion between banks. Vítor Constâncio hence emphasises that regulation should also aim 
at mitigating contagion and interconnectedness.106  
The Dutch Scientific Council for Government Policy identifies three canals through 
which the Dutch financial sector was affected by the crisis that originated in the U.S. On the 
asset side of their balance sheets, Dutch banks were considerably exposed to the global financial 
problems. An American subsidiary of ING for example had invested heavily in US mortgage 
packages. On the liability side of the balance sheet, Dutch banks made significant use of short-
term loans on international capital markets, causing financial problems when these markets 
became disrupted. In addition, banks were very poorly capitalized. The banks' equity were very 
low, making them poorly able to deal with high losses. These insecurities in the global financial 
markets led to a decrease in the global demand for goods, and because financial markets 
facilitate trade, imports and exports dried up. This was problematic for the Netherlands as they 
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are an open economy. As a result of the crisis domestic demand experienced a strong decline, 
partly by a loss in consumer confidence, which led the Dutch economy in a full blown crisis.107  
One of the biggest problems of the Dutch financial sector were thus the size and 
interconnectedness of Dutch banks. Almost all interviewee’s mention this defect as an issue 
that made the scale and effects of the financial crisis worse. They also mention it as one of the 
important issues on which regulation has not gone far enough. Figure 4 shows the amount of 
concentration in European banks by looking at the share of the country’s five biggest banks in 
terms of total banking assets in 1997 and 2010.108 It shows that the Netherlands has one of the 
most concentrated sectors with its top five biggest banks owning more than 80 percent of total 
assets. The contagion of these highly concentrated banks can also be illustrated by the fact that 
Fortis, a product of Dutch and Belgium smaller banks and insurers who took over ABN AMRO 
on 17 October 2007, lost a great deal as a result of the crisis events in the U.S. in 2008. For 
example the failure of Lehman Brothers alone costed Fortis 132 million euro.109  
Figure 4: Concentration ratio of European banks
 
Source: Erkki Liikanen. “High level expert group on reforming the structure of the EU banking sector” (Liikanen report), European 
Commission, (2012), p. 18. 
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The financial crisis did not only expose the intrinsic problems of the sector, it also made the 
vicious link between government solvency and failing financial institutions clear. On October 
the third 2008, The Dutch government had to nationalise and rescue Fortis/ABN AMRO for 
27,96 billion euros.110 Illustrating that “banks may be international in life but are national in 
death”111 stated by former governor of the Bank of England Mervyn King. National 
governments supervised banks within their country borders while most big banks operate on 
international scale. This makes proper supervision difficult as information problems are likely. 
When these big banks need recapitalisation national governments moved into a sovereign debts 
crisis because of the size of these banks.112 The financial position of member states deteriorated 
because of resolution of banks that were too big to fail. The worsened financial position of EU 
member states caused countries to experience difficulty in lending money from private creditors 
on money markets. This, in turn, makes these countries more dependent on ECB loans, while 
the liquidities that these member states collect from the ECB, come from the same banks the 
government in question is trying to rescue.113 Vice versa “these increasingly at risk domestic 
banks came to hold growing amounts of downgrading sovereign debt, while the ability of 
sovereigns to bail out banks in an orderly manner diminished as public debt loads rose”114, state 
Howarth, and Quaglia.  
When looking at the causes of the crisis, improvements in financial regulation in the 
Netherlands should deal with the exposure and interconnectedness of banks, the amount of 
leverage and the low capitalization of banks and the link between the solvency of governments 
and financial institutions.115 Political scientist Lucia Quaglia identifies three major issues that 
should be tackled to solve the crisis. She uses these as a benchmark to evaluate the responses 
of the EU against. First, because the crisis was partly originated and worsened by the lack of 
proper regulation in the financial sector, she proposes better and stricter regulation. The EU 
regulatory scope in the financial sector hence needs to be broadened and the underlying theory 
of approach should be less ‘market friendly’. Second, the links between government solvency 
and financial sector solvency need to be broken. Many European Banks owned many 
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government bonds of their own government as they were viewed as a safe investments due to 
the support of the EU and the ECB, however this proved to be no longer the case as the financial 
crisis brought the real risks and value of assets to the surface. Because governments had to bail 
out ailing banks, the problems of the financial sector shifted towards the public sector and 
created the sovereign debt crisis.116 This was especially problematic for the European sector 
and Quaglia suggest that regulation should be focused on breaking this links, furthermore 
mechanisms are needed to deal with cross-border failing banks. Third, the crisis emphasized 
the need of macroprudential supervision in the EU and financial regulation should be focused 
on that. According to the ECB macroprudential supervision aims at supervising the whole 
financial system and not just individual financial institutions (microprudential supervisions). 
Prudential policies relate to “actions that promote sound practices and limit risk-taking”117 
thereby limiting the change of systemic risks. 118 These issues should be reflected in new 
regulation and policy changes to properly deal with the causes of the crisis.   
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4. Methodology 
This explanatory research is positive in nature because it looks at the causal relationship 
between empirical data in a theoretical context. A deductive approach is therefore suitable to 
test the theory against the findings on policy learning in the financial sector in the Netherlands. 
The hypothesis that followed from theory on policy learning is that this research expects to find 
extensive policy learning in the Netherlands because the financial crisis has acted as a trigger 
to rethink policy in this sector. This research thus deductively tests this hypothesis with data 
from literature and interviews. Logically following from this hypothesis is the null hypothesis 
which states that this research finds no policy learning.  
 The methods used to answer the research question on the extent of policy learning in the 
financial sector in the Netherlands is a qualitative research consisting of process tracing 
combined with literature review and interviews. “Process tracing analyses trajectories of change 
and focuses on the unfolding of events over time119”. Because this thesis aims to better 
understand the causal dynamics of policy learning in the financial sector in the Netherlands, 
process tracing is a useful method as it “uses detailed, within-case empirical analysis of how a 
causal process plays out in an actual case”120. Hence it looks at the dynamics of policy learning 
which are illustrated by the indicators of learning and the literature surrounding the topic as 
mentioned in chapter 2. Subsequently the dynamics of policy learning are applied it to the 
specific case of this thesis, namely the Dutch financial sector. Process tracing enables this 
research to make stronger causal inferences. Because this is a one case study, namely the Dutch 
financial sector, it bereaves this research from the ability to make proper generalizing remarks 
about financial sectors in other countries, however these methods do provide the opportunity to 
gain strong in-depth knowledge about what drives policy learning. The latter creates better 
knowledge about the topic which can be generalized to other countries or even to other fields. 
The addition of literature review and interview both add to the process of researching the causal 
dynamics of policy learning and provide in-depth information and knowledge about the topic 
and the informants and helps to discover more exhaustive information about the process of 
learning. This thesis thus discovers what drives learning, what causally leads to learning and 
finally discusses whether the sector has indeed learned, or not.  
This study uses both primary and secondary sources. Primary sources in the form of 
semi structured interviews were held with officials from both the private and the public sector 
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in order to capture detailed information on their view on whether policy learning has taken 
place in the Dutch financial sector and to what extent. From the private sector interviews will 
be held with officials working at the three largest banks of the Netherlands, namely Rabobank, 
ING, and ABN AMRO, and who are dealing with financial regulation in their work fields. 
Furthermore officials from DNB will be interviewed as this institution executes government 
regulation on, among other things, supervision on financial institutions and acts as an advisor 
for these types of regulation. While DNB focuses more on the books and the directors of 
financial institutions, the AFM complements DNB by focusing more on customer relations, 
financial education, information and awareness. Hence an AFM official was included in the 
interviews. Lastly, interviews will be held with government officials or members of the Dutch 
Parliament who are in financial committees and have extensive expertise of financial regulation. 
This thesis chose to use semi structured interview as it provides the opportunity to access inside 
knowledge of the interviewee’s and to discover how the financial sector really changed after 
the financial crisis. The advantage of semi structured interview is that it is structured enough to 
steer the interview into the direction of the research question, by the use of an interview guide 
and it provides the opportunity to compare answers. But it also provides enough freedom to 
discover what the interviewee finds important to enclose about the topic, thereby enhancing the 
chance to learn new and relevant aspects of policy learning in the Dutch financial sector. The 
interview guide can be found in Appendix 1. Appendix II contains an overview of all the 
informants, their job titles, and the date, place and length of the interviews. All interviews are 
available with the author. 
Besides interviews, primary sources in the form of speeches, statements and debates and 
hearings in the Dutch House of Representatives will be analysed to investigate learning 
indicators and to determine an alteration in core beliefs about and within the sector. Secondary 
sources in the form of academic, peer reviewed articles, newspaper articles, articles and news 
items of banks and supervisory authorities, official government publications, and publications 
from international financial organisations will furthermore be used. These too will help to 
research the core beliefs and possible alterations in those beliefs in the sector. Additionally, 
coalition agreements will be used to discover the shift in priorities from Dutch government 
coalitions from before, during and after the crisis. Because financial regulation in the 
Netherlands is heavily intertwined with EU regulation, official EU publications on the topic 
will also be included.    
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4.1 Operationalisation 
The theoretical framework has identified six indicators that influence policy learning, their 
operationalisation is discussed here. First the quantity and quality of policy change, which is 
measured by researching the amount of new and changed regulation. This is done by looking 
at new directives and regulation both on the European and the national level. Their quality will 
be assessed by looking at whether these new regulations properly deal with the crisis problems. 
This is done by comparing them to the causes explained in chapter 3 and by analysing the 
answers of the interviewee’s on whether they felt that the improved regulation goes far enough. 
The second indicator is the tractability of the policy problem. While the causes of the crisis are 
already mentioned in chapter 3, the tractability of the policy problem will be measured by 
discovering whether there was consensus about these causes. This can be established by 
researching official statements from the Dutch government, the EU and sectoral players. But 
also by academic literature and the interviews with the informants. By asking the interviewee’s 
to explain what happened in 2007 the actors can express whether they thought there was a crisis 
in the researched policy field, and if there was a crisis what kind of crisis and what had caused 
it. This enabled this thesis to not only indicate policy failure, but also whether the actors were 
susceptible to learning and what went wrong in their eyes. It thus helps to make conclusions 
about policy failure, tractability and consensus of the policy problem. The learning indicators 
blame and responsibility, can too be measured through the interviews and through statements 
from both politicians, civil servants and industry officials. The indicators of policy learning 
have been converted into interview questions that by the use of the interview guide can be 
compared between informants. Questions like who is to blame and could the crisis have been 
prevented help to discover whether policy learning has taken place. Blame avoidance is 
furthermore operationalised by the three indicators of Hood: presentational strategies, selecting 
a policy position, and avoiding blame via institutions they have made responsible. Then, the 
influence of external financial institutions can be measured by looking at policy 
recommendations from international organizations like the IMF and the BIS. The research on 
their statements on causes and solutions and their involvement in the crisis will be investigated. 
Furthermore this thesis will include whether the involvement of these international financial 
institutions is mentioned by actors in the interviews and debates in the House of 
Representatives. Finally, the theoretical framework has shown that this thesis defines policy 
learning as “a process of updating beliefs about key components of policy”121. This alteration 
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of thought of a policy belief system can be captured by trying to discover a shift in the core 
beliefs of the interviewees. As this is strongly related to drawing lessons, this is operationalised 
by asking the informants what lessons they have learned from the crisis and discover whether 
concrete changes have been made that reflect an alteration in thought about the sector. As the 
neo-liberal view was dominant pre-crisis, this thesis will furthermore look for evidence of 
changes in, or opposition of this ideology within the sector. 
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5. Policy Change 
In the aftermath of the financial crisis a large amount of policies changed, new regulation was 
made and new initiatives were undertaken. As the theoretical framework showed, policy change 
is one of the indicators of policy learning, as learning is the driving force behind policy change. 
This chapter will therefore discuss new and changed financial policy and regulation in the 
Netherlands. Because of the truly vast amount of regulation introduced after the crisis, this 
chapter made a selection of the most important changes with an effect on the Dutch financial 
sector. It is furthermore important to remember that the quantity of policy change and new 
regulation alone is not an indicator of learning, it is the profoundness, source and quality of 
regulatory changes that matter. Therefore this chapter will also discuss where regulation came 
from, and whether or not current regulation is enough to properly deal with the causes of the 
crisis. This chapter will first discuss the general line of financial policy change, which was 
largely discussed at the EU level, and will then introduce changes specific to the Dutch financial 
sector to show how EU legislation was interpreted and implemented in the Netherlands. 
However, as mentioned before, when regulatory changes are mainly the result of higher lever 
governance that pushed for reform, it is likely that not much learning is done. Therefore it is 
important to consider how these regulatory changes were received and dealt with by the country 
of our case. In order to maintain an overview of all the meetings in which reform was discussed, 
and the different reports and committee’s that recommended different regulatory reforms in 
both the EU and the Netherlands, figure 5 provides a timeline overview of all these different 
aspects.  
Figure 5: Timeline overview of crisis events and institutional events for regulatory reform 
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 5.1 Financial policy change by the EU and Basel Committee  
Economist Barry Eichengreen illustrates in his article ‘International financial regulation after 
the crisis’ that many western countries have reacted to the crisis by focusing regulation on 
different flaws in the financial sector.122 Where the United States have for example aimed new 
regulation on “strengthening mortgage underwriting standards, moving transactions in 
derivative financial instruments onto organized exchanges, and curbing proprietary trading by 
depository institutions insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation”123 The UK 
stressed the importance of dealing with perverse incentives in the form of high bonuses and the 
Germans focused on better regulation on hedge funds and private equity firms.124 Increased and 
stronger regulation is inherently a good thing as solid financial institutions will stabilize 
financial markets by among other things reducing the problems arising out of moral hazard.125 
These differences in regulation however are problematic according to Eichengreen as financial 
institutions can easily move headquarters to locations where regulation is favourable and hence 
financial regulation should be coordinated across countries. The fact that many financial 
institutions indeed threatened to move headquarters, might indicate a lack of learning in the 
sector.  
The post-crisis reform agenda was largely shaped by the G20 countries. The G20 first came 
together in Washington in November 2008 to discuss the problems and solutions of the crisis.126 
It was in this setting where the major guidelines and reforms were established, which founded 
the basis for financial sector reform in the EU and hence for the Netherlands. Stellinga of the 
Dutch scientific Council for Government Policy points at the High Level Group on Financial 
Supervision, next to the G20, as the main shaper of policy. This group presented the Larosière 
report127 in 2009 which further influenced EU policy making.128 The general focus of reform 
lay on the improvement and tightening of regulation of the financial markets and supervision 
thereof. The most important policy reforms were the following:129 
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- Tightening of the capital rules for banks, and specifically on raising the (quality of) 
bank’s own equity buffers. Which should indirectly contribute to the lowering of the 
amount of leverage in the financial system. 
- Diminishing the pro-cyclical effects of regulation. This includes regulatory reforms on 
credit rating agencies, on accountancy rules, and on bonuses and capital requirements.  
- Increasing regulation onto institutions, instruments, products and markets that did not 
have sufficient or any regulation before the crisis. These include for example the 
regulation of hedge funds, money market funds and the shadow banking sector. 
- Reinforcement of supranational supervisory powers and better coordination and 
cooperation between national supervisors. For example the European Banking 
Authority and the European Systemic Risk Board were created. But also the creation of 
the Banking Union with supervisory powers for the ECB falls under this section.  
- Financial institution supervisors should receive more powers to act in case of financial 
problems. An example of this is the Directive for bank recovery and resolution. 
These examples130 illustrate a shift in the aim of financial regulation. Before the crisis financial 
policy intended to enhance the freedom of movement of financial institutions and capital flows, 
and the safeguarding of financial stability was of secondary order. After the crisis the 
safeguarding of financial stability became the main objective in financial policy. That was also 
amplified in the  Larosière report which stated that a profound review of regulatory policy was 
necessary and that “a consensus, both in Europe and internationally, needed to be developed on 
which regulatory measures on financial services were needed for the protection of customers, 
the safeguarding of financial stability, and the sustainability of economic growth”131.  
An important part of the post crisis reform agenda aimed at strengthening capital 
regulation and restricting the risks taken by financial institutions. These aims have also been 
stated in Basel III which were then translated into the Capital Requirements Directive IV and 
the Capital Requirements Regulation in the EU, adopted in July 2011.132 Basel III as developed 
by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) also focused on strengthening 
regulation, supervisions and risk management of the banking sector, but also aimed at 
enhancing the banks transparency. Basel III mainly introduced stricter capital, leverage and 
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liquidity requirements in comparison to its predecessors. Basel III has two key pillars namely 
capital and liquidity. The main reform in liquidity requirements for a bank is the Liquidity 
Coverage Ratio which aims to ensure that a bank “has an adequate stock of unencumbered high-
quality liquid assets that can be converted into cash easily and immediately in private markets 
to meet its liquidity needs for a 30 calendar day liquidity stress scenario”133. This will provide 
banks with better tools to internalise shocks and prevents that these shocks will spill over into 
the real economy. The other pillar of Basel III focuses on the capital requirements as it is 
important that a bank’s risk exposure is backed by a qualitatively sound capital base. Basel II 
has been heavily updated in this regard as the shortcomings of this previous framework became 
apparent during the crisis. Basel III will raise capital requirements for the trading book and for 
(re-)securitisations. A stressed VAR capital requirement is introduced based on a twelve month 
period of substantial financial stress.134 These now risk based capital requirements are 
complemented by a leverage ratio. The Capital Requirements Directive hence deals with both 
the quality of capital and the quantity of the capital ratio. Under this directive a leverage ratio 
of three percent has been implemented (three percent of the banks own equity relative to the 
banks total assets), which is a stricter lower limit than before the crisis. 135 Stellinga however 
viewed these reformed requirement merely as a broadening and tightening of the already 
existing policy rather than it being new and profound. The introduction of macroprudential 
policy is in that sense more a novel policy instrument and aims at making financial policy less 
pro-cyclical. For example part of Basel III is the anti-cyclical capital buffer in which national 
supervisors can increase the capital buffer in times of rapidly increasing lending, vice versa this 
buffer requirement can also be eased during more difficult times.136  
 Another important change in regulation in line with macroprudential supervision is the 
creation of the Banking Union in order to break the vicious link between government solvency 
and financial crisis. The Banking Union contains four components: a single rule book, an 
integrated framework for banking supervision, a common deposit guarantee scheme, and a 
single framework for the managed resolution of financial institutions. The Deposit Guarantee 
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Scheme (DGS) was updated as a result of the crisis. The pre-crisis directive ensured a level of 
protection or insurance for the depositor who would get up to 20.000 euros back in case of bank 
failure. While 20.000 euros was the minimum, the amount varied widely across member states. 
During the crisis it became clear that depositor’s confidence needed to be restored, partly to 
prevent bank runs, and the DGS was increased to a minimum coverage of 100.000 euros across 
the EU. 137 Besides the increase of the DGS, the EU aimed at creating a mandatory mutual 
borrowing facility. Which, in case of exhaustion of a national scheme, could borrow from 
another national fund. This basically was the start of a pan-EU DGS which was quite 
controversial. Because of national opposition, a true pan European DGS is still not in place. 
Banking supervision under the banking union falls under the Single Supervisory Mechanism 
(SSM), which is led directly by the ECB. National supervisors will play a complementing role 
in day-to-day supervision. Under the SSM, the ECB directly supervises the 120 largest banks 
of the Eurozone and EU countries that opted to participate. These 120 significant banks hold 
82 percent of total banking assets in the Eurozone.138 The Single Resolution Mechanism 
provides an emergency plan in case a financial institution does fail. To ensure resolution 
happens in an orderly manner the Single Resolution Fund was established which consists of 
contributions by banks according to their risk profiles. This should break the link between 
sovereigns and insolvent banks. Lastly, the Single Rule Book fully harmonizes all these rules 
throughout the entire EU.139  Some argue however that the Banking Union has not gone far 
enough. For example the addition of a common fiscal backstop for financial support during 
crisis situations seems necessary for some academics. Also the finishing of the Banking Union 
by ensuring a real Pan-EU DGS with a mutual borrowing facility is said to be needed to ensure 
financial stability and trust in the financial sector. Stronger trust in the financial sector will 
make serious liquidity problems less likely, this is important as liquidity problems are connected 
to the solvability of a financial institution. When a bigger bank like Rabobank for example 
would fail, a national guarantee fund would not contain enough to properly guarantee 
depositor’s savings, explains Bouke de Vries of Rabobank, while a European fund could take 
care of this.140 However there are many justified objections and worries around this Pan-EU 
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DGS as not all European banks have all their affairs in order yet. There are for example still a 
lot of non-performing loans in the system. These bad debts are “non-performing when more 
than 90 days pass without the borrower paying the agreed instalments or interest”141, hence the 
bank does not receive income in interest and must set aside more capital because these loans 
are likely not paid back. Subsequently this impedes the bank’s ability to provide new loans 
which can have negative consequences for the euro area economy. When these types of issues 
are not in order for all banks receiving access to this European guarantee scheme, the whole 
system will be at risk. Hence there is a lot of apprehension to engage in this extended 
cooperation.142  
 Next to the need for coordinated supervision at the EU level, the financial crisis also 
emphasized the lack of communication and transparency between supervisors on all levels. 
These issues contributed to a lack of proper macroprudential oversight. The Larosière report 
highlighted this matter and provided the European Commission with recommendations to solve 
this issue. Subsequently the European Systemic Risk Board was created and became in charge 
of monitoring macroprudential risks. Furthermore the European Banking Authority, the 
European Securities Markets Authority, and the European Insurance and Occupational Pension 
Authority were newly established and aimed at improving cooperation and coordination 
between national supervisors and controlled whether the supervisory standards were applied. 
However member states were reluctant in giving these newly created bodies too much power 
and to transfer national competences towards this European level. Hence the powers of these 
abovementioned new EU institutions were significantly watered-down during negotiations in 
the Council of the EU.143  
Furthermore in order to diminish the pro-cyclical effects of regulation, credit rating 
agencies were more intensely regulated too. Both the European Council and during the 
presidency of France for the Council of the EU already in 2008 emphasised the need for stricter 
regulation and supervision on these agencies. A revised code of conduct became a new 
benchmark against which credit rating agencies were held accountable. Now, all agencies 
whose ratings are used in the EU need to be registered and need to comply with certain rules 
which prevents perverse incentives as a result of the conflict of interest described in the chapter 
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on the financial crisis. Furthermore the rating methodology is harmonized and better supervised. 
The task of supervising these agencies was taken on by the newly created European Securities 
and Markets Authority who has profound investigative powers.144 
 
 5.2 Implementation in the Dutch financial sector 
The new focus on macroprudential supervision became also significantly entrenched in the 
Dutch financial sector. As of January the first 2014, the promotion of financial stability became 
specifically anchored in the Dutch banking law as a task of DNB. To foster this specific mandate 
the Central Bank had created a special department which focused on the organisation of 
macroprudential supervision. Furthermore the Financial Stability Committee was founded in 
November 2012 in order to indicate and signal risks for financial stability and to provide 
recommendations on how to deal with these risks. This committee consist of representatives 
from DNB, The AFM and the Ministry of Finance. Because of the Capital Requirements 
Directive IV, DNB had gained various instruments to enhance macroprudential supervision, for 
example the ability to demand higher capital buffers in case of sizable credit growth. The three 
biggest banks in the Netherlands ING, ABN AMRO and Rabobank for example had to 
implement a capital buffer of 3 percent.145 These Systemic Risk Buffers are aimed at preventing 
and addressing “systemic risks of a long-term, non-cyclical nature that are not covered by the 
Capital Requirements Regulation”146, the level of the buffer is set by the member state, in 
coordination with the ECB, and can hence vary between countries or even between financial 
institutions. With regard to the loan-to-value ratio, the ministry of finance is responsible to set 
this ratio. The Dutch ministry aims to diminish it by one percentage point per year, reaching 
200 percent in 2018, with the objective to lower it even further.147  
Another important change in the Dutch financial sector is the newfound attention for 
behaviour and culture. Because of the greedy image of the European banking culture 
characterized by risk taking and outrageously high bonuses was identified as one of the causes 
of the financial crisis, the need for reform on this topic became apparent. Several commissions 
and reports pointed in the direction of DNB to include an important aspect for behaviour and 
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culture within their supervisory frameworks. For example the Commission Scheltema 
researched the bankruptcy of the Dutch Dirk Scheringa Bank in 2009.148 The commission 
Scheltema exposed the fact that there was very much a culture of non-compliance with the law 
and principles as developed by the BCBS. Furthermore Commission de Wit, which was set up 
by the Dutch House of Representatives, researched the problems of the Dutch financial system 
and how to solve them (see figure 5 for where these commission place on the timeline 
overview). Important points of criticism of this commission were the bonus culture in the Dutch 
sector, the notion that making profit and reaching targets became more important than the 
greater good and the lack of self-criticism of banks were mentioned.149 Partly by the conclusions 
of these two important commissions, DNB adjusted its views on supervision in 2011 and gave 
more attention to behaviour and culture of financial institutions next to more attention to 
business model and strategy. The objective of this new department was a focus on healthy 
financial institutions who act with integrity.150 DNB calls this an important lesson learned from 
the crisis as “behaviour and culture at financial institutions can significantly influence the risk 
profile of these institutions”151. Furthermore as the supervisor DNB explained, certain types of 
behaviour and cultural aspects can identify risks and problematic issues before the actual figures 
of a bank indicate any problems. When in 2015 DNB had performed assessments on behaviour 
and culture on Dutch financial institutions, 34 out of 54 were identified as containing significant 
risks in behaviour and culture.152 In interview 5 Public Affairs advisor of Rabobank, Bouke de 
Vries, explained that before the crisis the role of incentives in the risk taking by bankers was 
not sufficiently recognized. If your bonus depends on taking risks and you personally are not 
hurt when the risk turns bad, there is no incentive to not take a lot of risk.153 This is a problem 
in both financial institutions and society, hence De Vries thinks it is a right step forward to 
focus more on these incentives and create regulation on these topics. ABN AMRO economists 
Han de Jong and Hein Schotsman identify the culture and atmosphere at ABN AMRO before 
the crisis as one of frightened bankers.154 Because of the financial globalisation and the EU 
internal financial market there was a lot of fear of mergers and acquisitions. A lot of emphasis 
was put on the next quarterly figures which needed to be better than the quarter before. They 
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describe the system as one that was quite harsh: “Maybe bankers knew that the financial system 
was headed in the wrong direction, but you could not really avoid it as an individual institution. 
You had to participate, because if you did not participate you would be left behind.”155. The 
short term vision had the upper hand and because of these incentives the attraction of risky 
products grew. An atmosphere that (indirectly) contributed to the financial crisis. A focus on 
behaviour and culture in the financial sector was thus needed. 
 In interview 4 DNB supervisor explained that before the crisis behaviour and culture 
did not receive specific attention in the supervision of financial institutions and now DNB has 
a specific mandate to do so. They can now encourage and foster financial institutions to make 
changes in their business culture156. Evaluations of the crisis showed that supervisors on more 
than one occasion had a certain negative intuition or feeling about a financial institution, but 
did not yet have the right indicators or tools to pin point problems within the culture of a 
financial institution. Thus these issues were not always addressed. Complementing financial 
supervision with supervision on behaviour and culture enables them to address behavioural 
risks early on. This helps to prevent bigger integrity issues or even financial problems.157 This 
DNB employee explains that culture and behaviour are rightly so an important component of 
supervision as culture and behaviour make clear statements about the risk profile of a financial 
institution. The financial crisis had shown that trust in the financial sector is related to financial 
stability and hence a focus on behaviour and culture is justified. However DNB states that there 
is no ideal culture that every financial institution should strive after. It is possible for risks to 
rise in all sorts of cultures and structures, however it is important to properly recognise and 
manage these risks. The Netherlands is a clear leader on the topic of behaviour and culture in 
Europe and other countries pay significantly less attention to this area, explains the DNB 
supervisor. This also means that behaviour and culture is not a part of supervision under the 
ECB within the SSM. And other countries only recently have started to look at the practices of 
DNB to include a behaviour and culture framework in their own supervisory authorities. The 
Netherlands hence plays an exemplary role in the EU. This DNB supervisor identifies this lack 
of an EU wide framework as one of the ways in which regulation can be improved. Further 
actions should also be taken to ensure that changes in behaviour and culture within financial 
institutions truly reach the core of a financial firm. Nevertheless he emphasizes the importance 
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that DNB has learned from the crisis in the sense that they now pay attention to culture and 
behaviour and use this as an indicator of financial stability.158  
The other Dutch supervisor AFM also underwent some important changes as a result of 
the crisis. In 2015 the organisation revised their mission by aiming to realise fair and transparent 
financial markets, in its 2016-2018 agenda the AFM added the notion of creating sustainable 
financial well-being in the Netherlands.159 In their supervision AFM focuses especially on 
behaviour and culture within financial institutions and towards the client. They furthermore 
have an expertise centre for researching consumer behaviour. AFM supervisor Retail, Ivo 
Thijssen, explained in interview 10 that the lack of rational decision-making for both the 
consumer and the financial professional was one of the most important realisations of the 
crisis.160 He explains that regulation was at large focused on the rational and economical man 
but this does not correspond to reality. Thereby emphasising Crotty’s point that the NFA was 
unrealistic as people are not able to make the best decisions about their competences of 
managing risk. Because behaviour and culture was indicated as a cause of the crisis, also by the 
AFM, their focus within supervision has switched towards not only looking at which behaviour 
is not within the rules or in fact illegal, but they have broadened their scope by also looking at 
harmful activities. These activities might be within the rules, but can still lead to harmful 
outcomes. Thijssen explained that this broadened scope was truly a result of the crisis. Customer 
interest and qualitatively good information provision have gained the upper hand. The AFM 
has implemented this by the creation of their ‘customer interest dashboard’ which was launched 
in 2010 as a reaction to the crisis. In order to supervise certain perverse behaviours and 
incentives in the market they monitor, financial institutions are being compared on for example 
their complaints and feedback management, mortgage advice and management, claim handling, 
and on behaviour and culture.161 The dashboard compares institutions to their direct competitors 
and hence uses peer pressure to improve their practices. Because their supervisory focus had 
switched towards normative actions points, like the handling of complaints, the relation 
between supervisor and financial institution had become more about dialogue than just about 
rules and lawyers arguing over details.162 
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 At Rabobank this new attention to behaviour and culture has resulted in a more 
customer-oriented approach compared to a product-oriented approach.163 Now the customer 
will be put first. Risk awareness was furthermore improved and many simplifications have been 
implemented in order to inform the customer in the best possible way about the risks associated 
with financial products in a clear and easy language. Teunis Brosens of ING also explained that 
before the crisis there was a stronger focus on growth and reaching sales targets. This focus has, 
since the crisis, shifted towards softer targets like the quality of provided credit and towards 
creating more awareness on risks and the spreading of portfolios.164 He furthermore emphasised 
a switch within ING to a more long-term qualitative relationship with the customer. This is 
amplified by their slogan: help customers to stay ahead in life and business. More tangible 
examples are several employee courses on integrity which discusses how to deal with certain 
(moral) dilemmas and the creation of their Orange Code which state honesty to customers and 
responsibility for their social and environmental impact as the highest values within the 
organisation.165 The new regulatory focus on culture and behaviour of supervisors has led to a 
prioritisation of the customer interest over stakeholder interest within ABN AMRO and realised 
more emphasis on the long term horizon.166 Another example on how ABN AMRO has changed 
as a result of the crisis was the prominence and the placement of their Chief Risk Officer at the 
highest level in the organisation, namely in the executive board.167 The creation of a separate 
risk officer at the highest level indicated the importance of risk in running a bank. Furthermore 
the executive officers that were related to the banks investment and private activities were 
placed at an executive level below the executive board. Often the investment bank branch of a 
commercial bank brings about most risk and most issues with risky behaviour and culture. 
Hence the placement of this executive committee at a slightly lower level indicated that this 
part of the bank is less important, that risks are being properly monitored and that the core 
activities of the bank prevail.  
Another tangible example of regulated changes in culture and behaviour is the 
implementation of the EU wide cap on banker bonuses. The bonus cap is set at the level of one 
year’s base salary and an exception can be made for a bonus of double the level of one year’s 
base salary but only with agreement of the shareholders.168 This is applicable to all EU banks, 
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but also to EU bankers working outside the EU jurisdiction and to offices of foreign banks 
located in the EU. The Netherlands however went even further than the EU standard by capping 
bonuses of all financial institutions at twenty percent of the fixed wage. Furthermore regulation 
in the Netherlands has made it easier to reclaim bonuses in case an employee has violated 
professional norms or the code of conduct. Also severance pay has been capped to a maximum 
of one year’s salary and bonuses without or limited performance are now forbidden.169 However 
with current Brexit events, both politicians and financial sector employees are demanding an 
easing of the bonus cap as they are aiming to get British financial institutions to Amsterdam. 
Kasja Ollongren, an alderman from the Dutch D66 party, complained that these British 
companies weren’t going to settle in the Netherlands as these strict bonus regulations were in 
place.170 A majority in the Dutch House of Representatives is seemingly in favour of easing the 
regulation on bonus caps. Especially centre-right governing parties VVD, D66 and CDA hope 
to adjust these rules to encourage the settlement of British financial firms.171 Hence lobbying 
to lower these bonus caps are again working at full speed. As DNB Supervisor for European 
Significant Banks, explained in the third interview: “When people are lobbying for you to that 
extent, when you as a bank have a choice on where to settle, you will act differently”172. This 
might indicate that perverse incentives could prevail again. This also indicates that we cannot 
say that banks are the ones who should receive all the blame, politics and society too help create 
the current financial system.  
To discuss the quality of the regulatory changes, this thesis asked the interviewee’s 
whether they thought policy change went far enough. All informants could however name 
different aspects for which regulation still falls short. Loman of DNB explains in his interview 
that the banking sector certainly has become safer, but he is not sure whether regulation has 
gone far enough. He for example mentioned the size of the Dutch financial sector as a 
problematic aspect that hasn’t been properly dealt with. He foresees that the size of banks will 
likely increase even further due to European integration which generates certain risks that are 
now left undealt.173 This was also emphasized by DNB Supervisor European significant banks. 
Furthermore Loman identifies that the capital requirements have improved but should be set at 
a higher level. These last two points have also been emphasised by political advisor of the Dutch 
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Labour Party (PvdA) Dirk Slieker during interview 2.174 In addition many interviewee’s express 
the shortcomings of the Banking Union either because of the lack of a proper EU wide DGS, 
the absence of a proper fiscal backstop or because banks still have too much debt on their 
balance sheets of their own governments. Despite their favour of more profound regulation, 
Loman and Slieker identify a lack of spirit and motivation both in the sector and in the political 
realm, to take regulation to the next level, which is indicated by most interviewee’s. The general 
sentiment of interviewee’s from commercial banks however is that regulation has gone for 
enough and more regulation is definitely not needed. This statement is largely backed by the 
supervisor European significant banks and the other DNB supervisor who also emphasise the 
need for better regulation instead of just more regulation, and warn about the regulatory burden 
that comes from too much regulation.  
 To conclude many policy and regulations did indeed change as a result of the financial 
crisis and a clear increase of regulation and policy reform can be recognised. Most interviewee’s 
confirmed that almost any identified cause of the crisis has been dealt with by regulation in 
some form or other. If we look at policy change as evidence of policy learning, a great deal has 
been learned in the Netherlands. Nevertheless, the quality of regulation varied. Much regulation 
was a result of pressure from higher level governance. Although the Netherlands does partake 
in these international negotiations, the pressure from a supra-national organisation might 
impede the opportunity for true policy learning as a member state is obliged to implement 
certain policy. Furthermore policy was not always profound enough to truly deal with crisis 
issues, but these complications to far-reaching reform were mostly political. The uncompleted 
banking union is an example of this. This issue is however also related to the policy cycle a 
policy issue makes in which the drive for policy change straight after a crisis is high, but 
diminishes once the economy is recovered and policy change is less urgent. Nevertheless this 
chapter also showed that the Netherlands went further than other country in areas like the 
restriction of bonuses and the addition of behaviour and culture in its supervisory framework. 
These gold-plating initiatives can be viewed as examples of learning from financial policy-
makers and DNB. When taken all this together, the overall amount and quality of policy change 
does indicate learning. Policy change here is the product of new information. The crisis brought 
financial sector deficiencies to the surface which induced the need for research and to evaluate 
policy. Policy change here reflects mostly May’s social policy learning which is about the social 
construction, scope and goals of policy problems. The goals of financial policy have changed 
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from unrestricted financial markets to financial stability and customer protection. And the scope 
of regulation has significantly increased to policy areas that were hardly regulated in the pre-
crisis period. Because this knowledge becomes integrated in the causal assumptions of the core 
beliefs of the policy, policy learning is likely to be present. The question that follows is whether 
this increase in regulation was pure crisis management or indeed truly reflects policy learning. 
To detect a change in core beliefs, the other indicators of learning will be researched in the 
following chapters.  
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6. Review of indicators of policy learning 
This chapter will review the remaining indicators of policy learning besides policy change. The 
remaining indicators are whether or not the policy problem is tractable and clearly understood, 
whether actors identify policy failure, whether they practice blame avoidance and whether they 
feel responsible for the crisis. Appendix III provides an overview, organised by type of actor, 
on what the interviewee’s had mentioned on these several learning indicators. Lastly this section 
will discuss the influence of external supra-national players on the policy issue and how it 
influenced the way national actors regard the policy problem. To research these issues, again a 
combination of interviews, literature and political debates will be discussed.  
 
6.1 A tractable policy problem 
“I need not emphasize to this audience just how extraordinary and challenging current times 
are”175 stated Jean-Claude Trichet, former President of the ECB, in a speech ‘Remarks on the 
financial turmoil’. During the crisis some consensus was established about the causes of the 
crisis, but like Trichet’s quote states, it was an extraordinary event. Eventually it became clear 
that the crisis originated in the U.S. and the fall of Lehman Brothers in 2008 made the crisis 
systemic. “The general consensus is that the primary cause of the recession was the credit crisis 
resulting from the bursting of the housing bubble”176, states economist Holt. The origins of the 
crisis were generally accepted, but different actors who look at the crisis from their own 
professional positions, strongly emphasise one issue over another. Nevertheless most accepted 
researches on the causes of the crisis roughly indicate the same problems, which are mentioned 
in chapter 3. Although there was consensus in general, figure 7 in Appendix III illustrates that 
almost all interviewee’s point out a different cause as the main cause.  
Loman from DNB emphasised the enormous growth of the financial sector in most 
countries and points at practices like lending money to people with bad creditworthiness, 
particularly in the US. Furthermore the banks’ own equity was greatly diminished and they 
became more dependent on whole sale finance. Fellow DNB colleague supervisor European 
significant banks agreed that the crisis was an extremely complex concurrence of several 
circumstances and also pointed at the extreme rate of financial innovation which made already 
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complex dynamics even more difficult to predict and understand. Moreover, the securitization 
of mortgages in the U.S. were mentioned by De Vries of Rabobank, Leijten of the SP, and the 
policy officer finance. In addition Brosens of ING specifically mentioned the fact that in every 
crisis real-estate is involved and both economists of ABN AMRO mentioned the failure of 
credit rating agencies. Apart from these ‘practical issues’ in the financial sector, many 
interviewee’s describe a certain culture or atmosphere in the financial sector that was conducive 
to the crisis. Supervisor European significant banks emphasised the unfounded trust in the 
ability of people to predict the system and calculate risk. Slieker of the PvdA stressed the fact 
that there was too much trust in the financial sector which had led to deregulation, inadequate 
precautions, too low buffers and no emergency plans. Letijen emphasised the enormous power 
the financial sector had, and in her opinion still has, to operate quite unrestrictedly. De Jong 
and Schotsman of ABN AMRO were surprised by the amount of social unrest, lack of trust and 
uncertainty in which the crisis had resulted. Thijssen of AFM indicated that these practices were 
a result of the free playing field for the sector that was initially granted by the government.  
Also on the question on whether regulation is the solution for all these issues, the answers 
varied. While some interviewee’s, mostly governmental actors, pointed at the need for more 
regulation, others, from both DNB and the sector self, indicated that you cannot regulate all 
risks and warn for the regulatory burden such an amount of regulation can cause. On 30 January 
2008 the Dutch House of Representatives organised a Round Table on the financial credit crisis. 
Academics, journalist, politicians, supervisors, economist, bankers, insurers and pension funds 
came together to discuss how the crisis could have happened, what went wrong and what needed 
to be done. Paul Tang from the Dutch Labour party summarized the views on the crisis as 
following: “The views seem to be changing. On the one hand I hear that we [policy-makers] 
have to leave it to the market and that professional investors are perfectly capable of assessing 
the risks, on the other hand I hear that perhaps better supervision is needed and that there has 
been herd behaviour: ‘we all went along and stood on the ice, while we individually thought 
that the ice might be too weak’. I find that [these contradictions] difficult.”177. During the same 
Round Table Van Stee from the Dutch private bank Van Lanschot Bankiers stated that: “The 
Dutch financial sector will be hit […] To what extent, nobody knows; if we knew that, we knew 
what we can expect at the stock market. It is clear that there is a lot of uncertainty.”178. This 
shows that even in such a high level crisis consultation, opinions about the crisis greatly differ 
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and a lot of uncertainty about the extent and effects of the crisis existed. Especially in the 
beginning of the crisis the uncertainty was predominant.   
This array of different views shows that the policy problem was difficult to trace. When the 
policy problem is poorly tractable it is likely that actors seek more external analytical input 
about the issue at hand, like (academic) research and empirical evidence, with the aim of 
learning.179 Political actors and policy-makers have especially done this by setting up 
parliamentary research committees to provide more information, which confirms the poor 
tractability. As the amount of research about the causes progressed, the consensus grew and the 
relationship between causes and solutions became clearer. When causes and solutions are clear, 
it is easier to learn. However, because this financial crisis was such an extremely complex 
‘perfect storm’ of multiple dynamics and actors, the tractability of the crisis was generally low. 
Tractability for learning is important as it provides clear quantitative performance indicators 
that ensure the measurability of learning. Despite the complexity and variety of problems in the 
sector, a couple of main causes have been discovered in the end. This was realised by doing a 
lot of research, also by independent agencies and by organising the parliamentary inquiries. 
According to Sabatier’s ACF, learning occurs when players in the policy field improve their 
understanding of the main variables that are indicated as important by their belief system or a 
competing belief system about the policy field. Furthermore the learner must refine his or hers 
understanding of the causal relationships between cause and solution that are internal to his or 
her belief system. And finally the challenges to one’s core beliefs must be identified and the 
actor needs to respond to this.180 The first two processes have happened during the course of 
the crisis by the amounts of debate and research that has been done. Due to this, actors have 
been able to learn more about different causes of the crisis and solutions and have been exposed 
to conflicting opinions and ideas. However the final step of challenging the core beliefs and 
responding to these challenges seems more difficult. Nevertheless the fact that most lessons 
have been converted into policy strongly indicates learning. The tractability of the policy 
problem has increased by the amount of research, debate and discussion about the topic. 
Consensus has grown, which would increase the probability of learning. However the 
complexity of the problem and the fact that actors are not able to identify a clear solution per 
problem, diminishes the changes of learning.  
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6.2 Identify policy failure, blame and responsibility 
As all informants identify that the Netherlands had experienced a financial crisis, they also 
indicate major policy failure in some form or another. When actors are dissatisfied with the 
outcomes or performance of policy it can encourage them to re-examine their beliefs about the 
policy field and can thus foster learning. The extent and severity of the crisis, and its 
consequences for the real economy were too big to be condoned. There is consensus about the 
fact that things went wrong, the costs were high, and that the crisis had an overall negative 
impact on society which indicates policy failure according to Howlett.181 The amount of crisis 
debates, round tables, and research committee’s indicate the fact that policy failure, both in 
politics as in the financial sector self, was recognized. However some interviewee’s indicate 
that a sector that thrives on risks cannot be completely regulated, and hence the root cause of 
the crisis was not (de)regulation or failure of government policy in their eyes. Slieker of the 
PvdA for example mentioned that the responsibility of the crisis completely lays with the banks 
and not with the lack of regulation. Nevertheless, what happened during the crisis is in his eyes 
proof that society does need more regulation as banks need to be constrained in their 
behaviour.182 The personal opinion of DNB supervisor European significant banks is that you 
cannot regulate risk “The idea that you can measure risk accurately and thereby regulate it is 
unrealistic. Risks do not disappear, but go somewhere else”183. The general consensus about 
the financial crisis however is that policy failure was indeed the case. When this is recognized, 
theory explains that actors are more open towards learning.184 
 The identification of policy failure is closely related to the concepts of blame avoidance 
and taking responsibility for the crisis. Accepting blame and responsibility about policy failure 
increases the opportunity for policy learning. As stated in the theoretical framework, the three 
indicators of blame avoidance by Hood provide a guideline to identify blame avoidance. The 
clearest indicator is that the government has delegated supervisory power towards the AFM and 
DNB. These institutional arrangement could be used to avoid blame as the responsibility is 
placed at another institution. However the three government officials that were interviewed 
point more at the financial sector self than at the supervisors when they were asked who was to 
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blame. However when other government documents are evaluated, many politicians do indicate 
that supervisors too have failed in their practices. Government officials and politicians thus 
point at other institutions to avert some of the blame. This was emphasised by Huizinga of the 
Liberal Party during a consultation of the permanent commission of Finance in the House of 
Representatives about the commission de wit: “The Dutch banks and insurance companies are 
jointly responsible. They have been guilty of irresponsible risk management and excessive 
lending. They went for success in the short term instead of in the long term.”185. Although these 
government officials and politicians recognize policy failure, none of them name this or faulty 
regulation as the main causer of the crisis in the interviews. While identifying policy failure as 
a cause of the crisis could indicate taking responsibility for this actors group. The policy officer 
finance nonetheless does indicate some responsibility for the government for the crisis but 
identifies shared blame for the sector and the consumer.186 This shows that this actor would be 
more susceptible to learning. Leijten (SP) and Slieker (PvdA) on the other hand avoid blame 
and do not feel responsible for the policy failure in the sense that they point mostly at the 
mishandlings of the sector instead of pointing at government policy. Leijten’s party had been 
an opposition party during the pre-crisis and crisis years in which her party had always opposed 
current financial policy and voiced a different view on the financial sector than that is currently 
dominant. The SP for example favoured a legal ban on all bonuses in the financial sector and 
they aimed to account all (financial) firms and institutions to their social responsibility.187 
Therefore the question of policy responsibility is less applicable for her. Because she already 
proclaimed a contrasting view on the sector even before the crisis, by expressing a support for 
a more socialist ideology for the sector and thereby denouncing the neo-liberal view on the 
system, her beliefs were not so much updated (learning) as more fuelled by the crisis. The PvdA 
however was a ruling party during the crisis and hence largely helped develop policy. Slieker 
granted full blame for the financial sector and expressed disappointment during interview 2 that 
not more financial sector officials were criminally prosecuted as a result of the crisis.188 This 
illustrates that these two actors are not likely to have learned from the crisis, but both for 
different reasons.  
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On the contrary, all interviewee’s from supervisory authorities (AFM and DNB) 
expressed a sense of shared blame and responsibility. For example on the question whether 
DNB could have done something different or better, Loman answered that “The organization 
has really changed. What implicitly does mean that there is recognition within the organisation 
that there was something to learn. Also at DNB there was in all likelihood an underestimation 
of certain risks. An important lesson that DNB has drawn is to sometimes act faster. People had 
already made good analyses of the problem, but it also comes down to acting on it”189. DNB 
supervisor for European significant banks explained that: “There was a lot of confidence in 
banks, the relationship between regulator and bank was one of dialogue. So not a relationship 
of mistrust where the supervisor continuously monitored and corrected the financial institution 
but instead one of constructive dialogue where the institution and the supervisor worked 
together. That is positive in itself, but also meant that supervisors were not always critical 
enough.”190. These quotes largely indicate the acknowledgement of failure and shared blame. 
These views were also reflected in debates, round tables and other official government 
documents. Former DNB president Nout Wellink stated in the before mentioned Round Table 
that: “We all have to look into our own hearts and all take a part of the responsibility”191. 
Because these supervisors are open to accepting part of the blame and responsibility they are 
more susceptive to learning. 
The sense of responsibility and blame of officials from commercial banks was also 
present. Because it was a financial crisis, all banks realised that they were the epicentre of the 
crisis. Nevertheless they did not feel that they deserve full blame and also point at other parties 
like the consumer who took out these loans and bought risky products. Strikingly, neither of 
them pointed at the lack of regulation as being the main issue, as these actors kept the negative 
consequences of too much regulation in mind and because the general sentiment was that you 
cannot regulate every risk. De Jong of ABN AMRO stated that: “All parties involved concern 
blame, the public too. The public is now very dismayed about banks, but the public has also 
done stupid things. The regulators have not kept a close eye on the situation, the rating agencies 
have blundered and in the event of a financial crisis the banks are the epicentre of the sector.”192. 
The shared sense of blame and responsibility of these commercial bank economists, largely 
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increased their probability of learning. To conclude, only governmental actors seem to have 
avoided blame and responsibility and hence diminish their opportunity to learn. This might 
coheres to the fact that politicians deal with re-election and supervisors and bankers do not. 
However the sense of policy failure, responsibility and blame of the other two actor-groups 
have motived them to reassess current policies and look for new approaches, hence it stimulated 
learning. 
 
6.3 Positive influence of external actors 
When external international organisations like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) shine 
new light on the policy issue, they can influence learning as they may offer new research and 
information and by providing a neutral analysis and view to the crisis at hand.193 
 The IMF’s reputation had actually depreciated after its practices during the previous 
recession in the 1990’s, because the IMF was “widely blamed for indirectly contributing to the 
earlier crises by advocating the premature removal of controls on capital flows, and then 
imposing harsh and inappropriate measures on the countries that were forced to borrow from 
it.”194. As a result the amount of IMF loans dropped. However Joyce explains in his book ‘the 
IMF and Global Financial Crises’ that this had changed in 2007. He finds that this financial 
crisis had in fact triggered international economic governance, and thereby the importance of 
the IMF in crisis coordination. An example of this extended international economic governance 
was the inclusion of the G20 countries instead of the G7 countries as the arena for international 
economic coordination. The G20 also aimed to reform the international financial institutions as 
a result of the crisis.195 As a result of the improved reputation the amount of IMF loans during 
this crisis period grew and against less strict conditions. These loans were distributed quicker 
and contained larger amounts of money than ever before. Even after the crisis, the IMF 
continued to cooperate with other organisations and national governments to continuously 
strive for global financial stability and better regulated markets. Joyce describes in his book a 
revival and rejuvenation of the IMF and thus a new found importance of this international 
organisation.196  
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 Despite the recovered status of the IMF, the organisation failed to predict the crisis.197 
The IMF had seriously underestimated the U.S. housing bubble and did not predict housing 
prices to drop. Furthermore once the housing prices did drop the IMF stated that it was “not 
likely to pose a serious systemic threat. Stress tests conducted by investment banks show that 
[…] most investors with exposure to subprime mortgages through securitized structures will 
not face losses”198. Which, with the benefit of hindsight, was incorrect. Moreover the IMF failed 
to recognize the risks that financial innovation could bring to financial stability and their 
relation to the instabilities in the U.S. housing sector were unclear to the organisation.199 
Furthermore its predictions for individual member states, like the Netherlands, were too 
positive. The IMF calculations right before the crisis were excessively optimistic and the impact 
of the issues with U.S. mortgages became only clear once the crisis was already unavoidable. 
In the pre-crisis years, the emphasis of the IMF was more directed towards global imbalances 
in which the roles of countries like China, Japan and other emerging economies were 
overrepresented.200 The IMF did however warned for individual issues and excesses in the 
sector. Already in its 2003 World Economic Outlook the IMF warned for the impact of busts 
in housing prices and equity as they are related to more substantial economic downturns than 
for example deteriorations in the stock market and that this was especially problematic for bank-
based sectors.201 In 2004 the World Economic Outlook focused on the dangerous thrive in 
global real estate and its link to certain macroeconomic factors like low interest rates and 
economic growth.202 Although individual problems in the financial sector were mentioned and 
warned for, the overall prediction of a stable financial system continued to be the IMF’s main 
narrative.203  
 Regardless of its failure to properly predict the crisis, once the crisis was in motion the 
IMF had provided large amounts of independent research about the financial crisis. In an IMF 
working paper ‘The Regulatory Responses to the Global Financial Crisis: Some Uncomfortable 
Questions’ the authors identify the challenges that in 2014 were continuously problematic for 
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a stable financial system.204 They advocated a reform of the system which was focused on three 
pointers: the need to adopt a system-wide perspective of the sector which should be aimed at 
addressing market failures (adopt a more macro oriented view); ensure a better understanding 
of the incentives of financial agents to better align their goals with societal goals; and lastly to 
acknowledge that crisis might always happen because there are still unknowns at play. In the 
light of these three identified problems the IMF does some recommendations: “Policy-makers 
need to resist, however, fine-tuning regulations: a “do not harm” approach is often preferable. 
And as risks will remain, crisis management needs to be made an integral part of system design, 
not relegated to improvisation after the fact.”205. These lessons and recommendations largely 
correspond to the lessons the Netherlands and the EU had drawn out of the crisis. Member 
countries take IMF research serious and look at this organisation as an important source of 
information. For instance during the financial crisis round table in the Dutch House of 
Representatives, the IMF was a couple of times referred to for its economic estimates.206 The 
IMF also published several papers with its lessons from the crisis. Their first crisis lesson was 
that “flawed incentives and interconnections in modern financial systems can have huge 
macroeconomic consequences. These need to be understood and tackled as best possible”207.  
Furthermore the IMF had implemented surveillance and monitoring initiatives in order 
to identify risks to stability and growth early on. This independent surveillance mechanism is 
in general appreciated by the receiving member countries. Part of this are the annual visits from 
the IMF to its member states to discuss the risks with both the government, its central bank and 
other sector officials.208 Surveillance and monitoring is thus done at a country specific level by 
an economic, financial and fiscal outlook. In 2011 for example the IMF stated that Dutch 
“equity capital-asset ratios were still relatively low and tighter capital standards need to be 
phased in under Basel III, proactive measures—including restraint on dividend payments or 
raising additional capital—to fill any residual gaps are desirable.”209. Member states do take 
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these recommendations into account. The IMF thus is quite heavily involved in its member 
states’ financial stability.210  
However when the IMF analyses are compared to other financial international 
organisations, the incorrect predictions of the IMF stand out. The BIS was for example 
considerately more cautious. The BIS pointed at the problems of the U.S. sub-prime mortgages 
and its housing market and warned for the consequences of excessive private credit. For the 
Netherlands in specific the BIS already in 2007 identified that a fall in asset prices “might have 
more serious implications for consumption. Because sharp equity price falls often occur in the 
lead-up to recessions, they are also seen to precede larger consumption declines more often than 
falls in house prices alone.”211. This organisation more clearly warned for negative effects and 
possibly a recession. Furthermore the BIS recognized early on the risks that were associated 
with the securitization of sub-prime mortgages. This is reflected in its 2007 Annual Report in 
which it states that: “tail events affecting the global economy might at some point have much 
higher costs than is commonly supposed”212. 213 Moreover the BIS plays an important role in 
the international financial community as it provides the forum where financial authorities, 
among which central banks, discuss the stability of the global financial system through the 
Basel agreements.214 The BIS encouraged and facilitated the creation of Basel III and thus 
played an important role in international crisis cooperation and shaping policy.  
As this thesis’ theoretical chapter had illustrated, the ability of international financial 
institutions to provide neutral and clear information to deal with the crisis at hand enhances the 
ability to learn. Though the IMF failed to provide the right information early on in the crisis, 
the fund was much more successful in aiding countries once the crisis took more shape and its 
consequences were clearer.215 To conclude, international financial cooperation and 
coordination was indeed important and present during the crisis period, however the arenas in 
which this cooperation took place were not the IMF but the G20, the EU, the Council of Finance 
Ministers of the EU, ECB and the BCBS. These organisations were heavily included in solving 
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the crisis and preparing action plans. With the exception of the BCBS, these organisation might 
not qualify as (external) International Financial Institutions. This was emphasised during the 
interviews in which the role of the IMF, the BIS, or comparable institutions, were not mentioned 
once by the informants. The actors were not heavily influenced by neutral information from 
these international players which indicates the limited role of these organisations in providing 
neutral and new information to help the member states.216  
The tractability of the policy problem was thus difficult, this was amplified by the failure 
of the IMF to predict the crisis. It hence took a while before the scope of the crisis was fully 
understood. While at one point consensus was reached, naming one clear solution is, even ten 
years after the crisis, still difficult. While all actors realised that policy had failed, taking the 
blame and responsibility for the crisis was not always the case. The majority of the actors 
nevertheless indicated a shared sense of blame in which multiple actors, including their own 
organisations, contributed to the crisis. Finally, international crisis cooperation grew in which 
the BCBS was especially important for reform together with the EU and ECB. These were the 
organisations that were mentioned by the interviewee’s and in the researched literature. 
Surprisingly the IMF had a limited role in crisis coordination and might even worsened the 
situation by not predicting the crisis on time. Again, figure 7 in Appendix III provides an 
overview of the answers the informants provided in the interviews on the learning indicators 
and thus provides empirical evidence on learning. By analysing these different learning 
indicators, this thesis indicates that the ability of actors to learn from the financial crisis is 
relatively high.  
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7. Change in core beliefs 
“The all-powerful market that always knows best is finished” – Nicolas Sarkozy, 2008217 
This thesis has identified policy learning as “a relatively enduring alteration of thought or 
behavioural intentions that are concerned with the attainment (or revision) of the precepts of a 
policy belief system”218. Or stated more simply, the updating of core beliefs and key aspects of 
a policy field. While all the indicators as mentioned in the theoretical framework have been 
discussed, the final step is to decide whether or not the sector has indeed shown a change in 
core beliefs.   
An important change in core beliefs is identified by Fenger and Quaglia. Before the 
crisis the financial sector can be characterised as a sector led by the functioning of the free 
market. The EU pre-crisis financial sector was shaped by the inclusion of the financial market 
into the EU’s internal market, thereby facilitating capital to move freely across borders. The 
overall trend of deregulation and lack of regulation whatsoever fits in well with what Fenger 
and Quaglia call the market-making advocacy coalition. The Netherlands too, like the U.K., the 
Irish and the U.S., had implemented this market-making framework of light-touch regulation 
and free market forces. “The deep core belief of the market-making coalition can be 
summarised as “market trust””219 stated Fenger and Quaglia, and can be linked to the core 
notions of neo-liberalism. Financial markets were believed to be efficient, self-correcting, 
rational, and able to determine their own risk. Therefore the role of the government was just to 
facilitate the market. A good example of this sentiment is the repeal of the U.S. Glass–Steagall 
Act in 1999. The act, which was implemented after the Great Depression, realised a separation 
between commercial and investment banking activities.220 Many claim that the merger of these 
different financial activities in one single financial institution contributed to the size and the 
instability of the financial system in the U.S. as these multifunction banks lead to a conflict of 
interest and can produce perverse incentives that lead to anti-competitive and even deceitful 
behaviour.221 Now many economist and other sector officials emphasise the importance of 
separating these activities or reinstalling the Glass-Steagall Act also in the European sector. 
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Economists De Jong and Schotsman of ABN AMRO too emphasised this point, that the repeal 
of this law had increased financial instability. Schotsman would also be a proponent of the 
return of such an act.222 Commission de Wit too recommended to shield utility activities from 
investment banking activities in same institution. The rationale for this is that savings under the 
DGS should not be at risks because of investment banking activities.223 Because this market-
making approach was also leading in the Netherlands, regulation in the financial sector aimed 
at fostering competition and market efficiency. This approach was understandable with regard 
to the country’s open and service-oriented economy. From the 1980’s onward the focus in the 
Netherlands lay on this freedom for financial institutions as policy-makers thought this would 
lead to more competition and therewith to a more efficient allocation of financial resources and 
to higher levels of economic growth.224 Renske Leijten, explains in interview 7 that she 
recognizes that the dominant discourse in the House of Representatives is still one of neo-
liberalism.225 She for example favours higher buffers, a parting of the core activities of a bank 
with all its commercial activities and is in favour of a full reserve bank. Furthermore she 
illustrates that she aims to strengthen other powers in the economy, like those of the workers, 
in order to diminish the enormous power the financial sector currently has. Leijten is for 
example committed to realising an employee meeting next to a shareholders meeting of large 
companies and banks. Although these ideas find common ground with certain economist like 
Thomas Piketty, she explains that these socialist opinions receive no support throughout the 
House of Representatives and that she stands alone in this narrative. The neo-liberal view on 
the financial sector is for Leijten one of the root causes of the crisis. This point is emphasised 
by a report about the ‘State of the Euro’ by the Dutch Council of State, in which they state that 
the unforeseen imperfections of the Economic and Monetary Union are the risks in financial 
markets as a result of liberalisation and deregulation of the market, the strong increase in private 
debt, and the enormous interconnectedness between governments and banks.226 All symptoms 
of neo-liberalism as Leijten calls them. A real change in the sector’s ‘core beliefs’ might be 
indicated by a greater audience for a less neo-liberal narrative. However this seems not to be 
the case in Dutch politics.227  
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Another characteristic of the market-making advocacy coalition was the enormous 
influence of the lobby of multinational financial institutions. Former Green Left politician Kees 
Vendrik stated during the public hearings in the Dutch House of Representatives after the results 
of the Commission de Wit that “The lobby of the financial sector has hindered supervisory 
legislation for more than thirty years”228. It shows that these free market objectives were valued 
over objectives like financial stability and consumer protection which characterise the 
contrasting “market-shaping” advocacy coalition framework. The market-shaping coalition was 
rather weak before the crisis in the Netherlands. The government consisted largely of the 
Liberal VVD party and the two supervisory authorities as market-shaping institutions lacked 
the regulatory tools to properly intervene. On various occasions both DNB and AFM had 
warned for certain risks and pleaded for the inclusions of several supervisory tools.229 For 
example during the public hearings in the Dutch House of Representatives after the results of 
the Commission de Wit, then president of DNB Nout Wellink stated: “The rules in the financial 
sector are inadequate for proper supervision and the Netherlands itself must introduce stricter 
rules if no agreement is reached internationally”230. If policy learning indeed happened in the 
Netherlands, the market-making core belief would be overturned as a result of the crisis.  
When we look at the vast amount of new and changed regulation they can best be 
categorized under the market-shaping coalition. Many issues that were left unregulated now 
are, and new institutions like the European Banking Authority have been created. These were 
all efforts to shape the market and aim for financial stability and consumer protection. The 
creation of the Banking Union is also a clear example of a market-shaping view. The large 
amount of regulation showed that policy-makers and supervisors had reconsidered their 
profound trust in financial institutions. Slieker for example mentioned in interview 2 that his 
most important lesson of the crisis is that “We shouldn’t be naïve. A large period of 
deregulation, the idea that the market will solve it, and the trust in the good of man lay at the 
roots of the crisis. But if you let it go unregulated, it will get out of hand. Whether it is laziness 
or greed, it gets out of hand.”231. This alteration of ‘blind’ trust in the sector, especially by 
governmental actors can be considered a change in core beliefs.  
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 Another indicator of the lack in trust in financial institutions was the heavily debated 
blueprint of Basel IV. The BCBS aimed to standardise risk models used for the calculation of 
risk weighted assets and capital ratios of financial institutions and to constrain financial 
institutions to use their own models.232 Because the miss calculation of risk was identified as 
one of the causes of the crisis the BCBS aims to revise the use of risk models which are 
ultimately used to calculate the minimum capital requirements. This focus of the new Basel 
agreement can be viewed as a lack of trust in financial institutions to properly calculate their 
own risks. Banks in general are displeased by these developments and Bouke de Vries of 
Rabobank also mentioned in interview 5 that they view this development as a motion of distrust. 
De Vries mentioned that Rabobank prefers working on improving risk models by benchmarking 
them and imposing stricter requirements on the data you put into those models instead of 
standardizing them.233 These views were largely reflected by Teunis Brosens form ING who 
mentioned not to support the complete standardizing of these risk models as proposed by the 
BCBS .234 The BCBS aims to link minimum and maximum output levels of risk to these models 
and thereby indirectly states that they do not trust the free operation of these risk models of 
individual banks. Because situations between markets can vary a great deal, it makes no sense, 
according to some bankers, to standardize and harmonize these models.235 Dutch mortgages for 
example are known to be very safe in comparison to other countries because of the stable value 
of the collateral, well developed insolvency laws and the high payment discipline by borrowers. 
It would be wrong not to make a distinction in these underlying risk drivers. ABN AMRO 
economists de Jong and Schotsman however emphasised that risk models used by banks are 
often calculated with a scarce amount of data and can lead to false certainties and securities.236 
Therefore they are sympathetic to the idea of standardizing these risk calculation models. 
 The loss in trust in financial institutions caused by the crisis has thus led to a switch 
towards a market-shaping form of regulation and view of the sector. This contrasting advocacy 
coalition has effectively managed to exploit the crisis situation in order to show that their ideas 
are better suitable to deal with policy failing than the market-making coalition. Fenger and 
Quaglia illustrate in their article ‘The Global Financial Crisis in Comparative Perspective: Have 
Policy-makers “Learnt Their Lessons”?’ that changes in financial regulation in the EU were 
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largely pushed by France and Germany who they characterise as countries with a mostly 
market-shaping view on the financial sector.237 Nicolas Sarkozy, former President of France, 
stated in 2008 that “The idea of the all-powerful market that must not be constrained by any 
rules, by any political intervention, was mad. The idea that markets were always right was 
mad”238 and a reinvention of the financial sector was needed to ensure a higher moral standard 
and a better regulatory system.239 At large this thesis discovered a switch to a market-shaping 
coalition on the European and Basel level. The Netherlands is co-decider in these two levels of 
governance and can thus be partly regarded as a country that learned from the crisis.  
But these market-shaping views were not always fully supported by countries like the 
Netherlands that always had complied with a market-making way of regulating the sector. 
Before the crisis the Dutch financial sector was characterized by an aggressive and strong 
international expansion strategy. Financial policy, implemented by a liberal Minster of Finance, 
was aimed at facilitating this expansion and the acquisitions of other foreign banks.240  But after 
the crisis the Dutch government realised that the pre-crisis supervisory instruments weren’t 
sufficient and it increased its options to intervene in the financial sector by implementing the 
Interventiewet, or Intervention Act, in 2012. The Act made it easier for supervisors to intervene 
earlier on when financial institutions encounter problems or even bankruptcy and can actively 
navigate a financial institution towards proper settlement in case of bankruptcy to reduce social 
costs. The Act thus transcended the mostly preventive character of previous instruments. 
Furthermore here too the importance of macroprudential supervision on the sector became 
clear. These topics were later on dealt with at the European level by creating a banking union, 
however master of law Vrolijk explains that the Netherlands did not want to wait for European 
regulation as it was not expected that it would be ready in the short term.241 This was also 
emphasised by Huizinga of the Liberal Party who stated during a financial consultation to 
discuss the results of Commission de Wit, that: “We all know that introducing such European 
rules can be a lengthy process, but this should not be a reason to postpone necessary measures. 
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We would rather wait for Europe, but certainly not too long”242. Again, the Netherlands aimed 
to take an extra step, in comparison to the EU, towards the realisation of financial stability 
The strength of the pre-crisis market-shaping coalition was thus perceived as weak. 
However the (parliamentary) committees that were established emphasised the need for more 
tools for supervisors and an overall improved supervisory framework. Thereby strengthening 
the market-shaping coalition. These recommendations were taken on by the government and 
improved regulation came in place, providing supervisors with more power. Moreover the 
Minister of Finance position has after the outbreak of the crisis been fulfilled by either Social 
Democrats or Christian Democrats instead of Liberals. Hence the position of the market-
shaping coalitions was strengthened, which undermined the neo-liberal dominance in Dutch 
politics. Fenger and Quaglia also indicate that Dutch policy-makers are learners of the crisis as 
they too identify this switch towards the marker-shaping manner of regulation. Especially 
because according to them the Dutch Ministry of Finance realised the lack of tools to properly 
supervise and intervene in the financial sector, and new tools to shape the market have been 
realised as a result of the crisis. The fact that the Netherlands have gold-plated on some of the 
EU regulations provides evidence for this view.  
 
 7.1 Lessons learned  
As drawing lessons is an important part of policy learning, this next section will focus on the 
lessons learned out of the 2007 financial crisis, both as mentioned in the interviews and as 
retrieved from the literature. As the concepts of Rose explained, lessons are part of the 
evaluation of a policy programme and go even further by evaluating whether policy-makers 
would implement the same policy.243 When the crisis reached the Netherlands and the problems 
in the financial sector became apparent, the government first reacted with pure crisis 
management as some financial institutions had to be saved over the course of one weekend. In 
the Dutch Ministry of Finance a crisis team had been set up and in the House of Representatives 
several crisis-debates were held.244 When the immediate pressures of the crisis had diminished, 
the government started up several committee’s to discover what had happened, which was 
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aimed at facilitating learning (figure 5 provides a timeline overview of these committee’s and 
other crisis initiatives).  
First a Temporary Parliamentary Research Committee Financial System, also known as 
‘Committee de Wit’, had been installed at 24 June 2009 and published its report at 11 April 
2012.245 This committee investigated the structural problems of the Dutch financial sector and 
researched the measures taken by the government to support the banking sector. Their most 
important conclusions were first of all that the recognizing of macroeconomic risks needed to 
be improved. The Committee identified that the underlying causes of the crisis lie at the field 
of international macroeconomics for example trade, globalization, financial liberalization and 
monetary policy.246 Subsequently one of the most important recommendations of the committee 
was the proper provision of information towards policy-makers and legislators about 
macroeconomic developments and the importance of adding a macroprudential view on 
supervision. The latter had gained momentum not only under policy-makers but especially 
under academics which on this particular issue had influenced both policy-makers and the 
sector itself. 247 The idea that a macroeconomic view in supervision is highly important for 
financial stability was thus an important lessons. The new focus on macroeconomics falls under 
a conceptual framework that was built on concepts and ideas of economist like Kindleberger248 
and Minsky. Minsky for example stated in his 1986 ‘Stabilizing an Unstable Economy’ that 
“Only an economics that is critical of capitalism can be a guide to successful policy for 
capitalism” 249. Minsky was specialised in financial fragility and tried to explain why financial 
systems are susceptible to crises. Minsky defines the financial market as inherently unstable 
and states that the financial world is characterizes by uncertainty and not by quantifiable risk. 
“The expectations of lenders and borrowers fluctuate (often dramatically) in a regularly 
repeated cyclical process. Depression gives way to confidence, which grows into exuberance 
and excitement before collapsing into despair. These mood swings are reflected in financial 
transactions, as caution is replaced first by optimism and then by euphoria”250, explained King 
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about Minsky. Capitalist financial institutions are inherently flawed as its innovative and 
speculative fundamentals will lead to instability.251 In order to prevent crisis from happing 
Misky, among other things, points at a strong task for (macroprudential) supervision and 
regulation of the financial sector to avoid excessive speculations and overall market 
exuberance.252 Both Renske Leijten (SP) and Han de Jong (ABN AMRO) mention the 
meaningfulness of Minksy’s ideas. The revival of such ideas and the emergence of criticism on 
neo-liberal capitalism, also in the Netherlands, illustrates at least some changes in the core 
beliefs about the sector. Whether these newly discovered, ‘older’ theories fully make their 
reappearance in thinking about the financial sector will be difficult to predict, but will likely be 
a long process. However, the fact that these ideas made their way into current discussions, 
shows some alteration of thought about the core beliefs of policy and hence indicates learning. 
Stellinga emphasised this point by stating that these economist before the crisis were left 
ignored in the Netherlands, and worldwide, as their ideas did not reconcile with the dominant 
framework of self-correcting stable financial markets.253 A change in core beliefs is present as 
these economist are being taken more seriously and critical views on the current system are 
being pronounced and heard. An important outing of this is the fact that the attention on 
macroeconomic developments have been included in the supervisory framework.  
A second important lesson of the Committee de Wit was the responsibility of the 
financial sector and the changes in behaviour and culture that were deemed necessary254. The 
Committee concluded that there were important risks that the financial sector structurally 
underestimated or did not acknowledge. Furthermore a lack of knowledge about these risks on 
financial institution’s own balance sheets was identified. The Committee indicated certain 
perverse incentives like an extreme focus on commercial interests to be the root cause of these 
problems. Their final conclusions were that both the legislator and supervisor had failed in 
properly executing their tasks. For legislators the Committee pointed at the far-reaching state 
of deregulation and liberalization in the sector and for the supervisors the Committee re-
emphasised the need for a macro view and a focus on behaviour and culture within financial 
institutions.255 These lessons were largely converted into action and is included in policy.  
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 Another influential parliamentary committee was the Committee Inquiry Financial 
System.256 The House of Representatives had started an investigation of the financial crisis, 
which was also used to monitor the handlings of the government. During a parliamentary 
inquiry important witnesses are interrogated and obliged to speak under oath about their 
handlings during crisis events. The specific task of this Parliamentary Inquiry was to gain 
insights and to judge the crisis measures taken by the Dutch government in the period of 
September 2008 until January 2009. It looked at how public funds were used in order to draw 
lessons for the future.257 This Committee identified several flaws and failures of both legislators 
and the Ministry of Finance and the supervisors, mainly DNB. The Committee concluded that 
the crisis had painfully exposed some of the shortcomings and deficits in financial legislation. 
One of the problems that the Committee indicated was that the shortcomings in regulation 
facilitated the fact that capital requirements could be set at a too low level which had resulted 
“in an insufficient disciplinary effect of these capital requirements on the process through which 
financial institutions evaluate and take risk”258. Here too, virtually all recommendations from 
these Committees were included in new regulation. Both the supervisory authorities and the 
Ministry of Finance learned that their tools were insufficient and these lessons were directly 
taken on by increasing the tools and mandates of both parties. As presented in the theoretical 
chapter, Biegelbauer defined that actors engage in learning when they gain policy-relevant 
knowledge as a result of assessments of past policy. These governmental committee’s evaluated 
past policies, identified policy problems and gained knowledge. Furthermore they provided the 
tools and skills in the form of specific recommendations to improve policy. The reports of these 
committee’s and inquiries helped draw conclusions about the sector for governmental actors, 
supervisors and private actors and thus facilitated learning.  
During the interviews the informants were also asked what their most important crisis 
lessons were. Figure 6 provides an overview of these lessons. At large these lessons correspond 
to the lessons as mentioned by the Parliamentary Committees. Nevertheless it also shows that 
each informant takes completely different lessons out of the crisis. 
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Figure 6: Overview lessons of the crisis by interviewee’s 
 Overview Interview question: What is the most important policy lesson out of the crisis? 
 
Name informant Lessons 
Supervisors Herwin Loman 
(DNB) 
DNB must sometimes act faster, and focus on macroprudential 
supervision. 
Supervisor European 
significant banks 
(DNB) 
Focus on macroprudential supervision. 
Supervisor  
(DNB) 
Importance of behaviour and culture (underlying motives and 
assumptions of financial institutions) as an indicator of financial 
stability. 
Ivo Thijssen  
(AFM) 
Regulation assumed that both consumers and professionals act 
rationally, but this is not the case. And focus more on what is harmful 
to the consumer instead of what happens outside the regulation. 
Commercial 
Banks 
Bouke de Vries 
(Rabobank) 
The external orientation of banks needs to be improved, should have a 
better focused social antenna. This means being more focused on the 
customer, increasing transparency and simplifying products. 
Teunis Brosens (ING) With every crisis is one way or another real estate involved, and 
concentration risks need to be avoided especially in real estate. 
Han de Jong 
(ABN Amro) 
The importance of customer interest first instead of the shareholder 
interest first, with an emphasis on the long term. And the importance 
of ensuring and keeping trust in the financial sector.  
Hein Schotsman 
(ABN AMRO) 
The importance of customer interest first instead of the shareholder 
interest first, with an emphasis on the long term. 
Government Dirk Slieker  
(PvdA) 
We mustn’t be naïve and blindly trust the banks, less trust in laissez 
faire for the financial sector. Thus more regulation is needed to keep 
the sector in line. 
Renske Leijten  
(SP) 
Financial products no longer represented their real value in the real 
economy, this must be broken. Banks are too big. But doesn’t think 
any real learning has been done in the bigger picture.  
Policy officer finance 
(political party) 
 
Too much interdependence in the financial sector, banks were too big 
to fail. We have to cooperate on a European level to improve 
supervision, also on other country’s financial sectors.  
 
In general terms, the supervisors have learned the importance of macroprudential supervision 
and the importance of incorporating behaviour and culture into the supervisory framework. The 
commercial banks identify the importance of putting customer interest first. Lastly, 
governmental actors generally learned to decrease the power of the financial sector by both 
trusting them less and creating more regulation. The lessons the interviewee’s have indicated 
do point towards learning out of policy failure. However realising real change in institutions, 
either private or public, is a tough process. The AFM mentioned in their 2016-2018 agenda that 
the financial institutions they supervise experience difficulties with implementing these 
necessary changes all the way to the core of the firm. They state that “Traditional financial 
companies have taken steps in recent years to embed customer interest in their organizations. 
We see, however that they are struggling with the sustainable anchoring of the necessary 
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behavioural culture change. This continues to lead to smaller and larger incidents.”259. 
Furthermore another important party that was involved with the crisis was the ordinary citizen 
or customer. The majority of the interviewee’s point out that these were the ones that took out 
loans they could not afford, asked for and bought these risky products and hardly took the time 
to properly inform themselves. The customer is not indicated as the actor-group that should take 
all the blame, but a group that in the eyes of the interviewee’s should ideally learn as well. 
Thijssen of the AFM however clearly states that this is the group that hasn’t learned from the 
crisis at all. He still notices in his work that these people continuously buy risky products often 
from the internet and from abroad without gathering important information about the risks 
involved. The fact that these informants illustrate that learning is not indicated at the general 
public, is worrisome for the future of the financial sector as this group provides incentives for 
the sector.  
 
7.2 Review of Coalition Agreements 
To see whether these lessons have had an enduring impact on current policy, even a decade 
after the financial crisis had hit, this thesis will look at coalition agreements. A coalition 
agreement is a written document that contains the intended policy of the newly elected cabinet. 
By looking at the new coalition agreement of 2017 and comparing it towards pre-crisis and 
midst-crisis coalition agreements, this thesis can identify whether a change in core beliefs of 
the financial sector is indeed the case.  
Right before the financial crisis hit, the Netherlands had formed a new government with 
both Christian Democrats (CDA), The Labour Party (PvdA) and a Christian Party (CU). The 
name of their coalition agreement was ‘Working together, Living together’.260 While the 
agreement pays a lot of attention toward a more active role of the Netherlands on the 
international stage with an innovative and competitive economy, there is no mentioning of any 
general policy for the financial sector or on banks specifically. One of the main aims is to foster 
an innovative, competitive and entrepreneurial economy and to ensure prosperity for all in a 
world of enhanced globalisation. However in order to truly create such an economy, the 
financial sector would have to play an important part in distributing and allocating money.261 
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The fact that the financial sector is not even mentioned in the coalition agreement indicates the 
lack of regulation and the free playing field the sector enjoyed at the time, which coincides with 
notions of Crotty’s NFA. 
The 2012 coalition agreement ‘Building bridges’ by the Liberal Party (VVD) and the 
Labour Party (PvdA), was also a true reflection of the then political landscape.262 The agreement 
was focused on getting the treasury in order by implementing austerity throughout several 
policy fields. A healthy financial sector was perceived as essential for the proper functioning 
of the Dutch economy. The coalition agreement reflected on the large risks financial institutions 
had taken and their negative effects on the real economy. The document stated that profound 
reform in the banking sector was necessary to prevent these mishandlings from happening. The 
agreement for example mentioned the mandatory bankers-oath, and products that are not in the 
best interest of the customer, may not be sold. The care-taking duty of banks, and the fact that 
they’re not just commercial businesses, should be legally anchored according to the coalition 
agreement.263 Furthermore the agreement stated that the Netherlands supported the Basel III 
capital requirements, international cooperation on a tax levy on the financial sector, and the 
creation of the EU Banking Union. The need for a bonus cap was approved and the coalition 
agreements mentioned the increase of the capacities of the Fiscal Intelligence and Investigation 
Services to tackle fraud, money laundering, tax abuse etc.264 The agreement mentioned eleven 
concrete policy actions to be taken with regard to the financial sector, next to an array of 
descriptive sentences on what the objective of the financial sector should be.  
Finally the 2017 post-crisis coalition agreement ‘Trust in the future’ of the Liberal Party 
(VVD), the Christian Democrats (CDA), Social Democrats (D66), and the Christian Party (CU). 
This agreement reflects a less urgent policy vision for the financial sector.265 In the six concrete 
policy actions for the financial sector the agreement mentioned that the support for the Basel 
agreements remains and the Basel IV leverage ratio requirements will be implemented in the 
Netherlands, but no gold-plating will be done. However the agreement also aims to make it 
easier for Fintech companies to enter the financial market as they contribute to innovation and 
competition in the sector.266 This easing of access for Fintech companies can be viewed as a 
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step towards deregulation with a strong motive for profit. Which would indicate a return 
towards the market-making coalition. On the other hand the cabinet aims for strengthened 
regulation of the trust sector and wants to increase the supervisory instruments of DNB in this 
sector. Furthermore the cabinet expresses through this coalition agreement that they do not 
support the financing of debt of other EU member states nor support the realisation of a transfer 
union or the creation of Eurobonds. While this is not a surprising statement of the government, 
it does reflect a lack of solidarity and willingness to truly fulfil the banking union.267 
 
7.2.1 Issue-Attention Cycle  
These three coalition agreements clearly show the effect of a crisis on a policy field which is 
related to the issue-attention cycle a policy issue makes. All the interviewee’s identified a 
commitment from both the market, supervisors and politics to reform policy and prevent crisis 
from happening. However this commitment and effort diminished greatly when the crisis was 
slowly moving to the background. Most informants also mentioned that regulation on some 
issues still do not go far enough to properly deal with the causes of the crisis, but the drive to 
act on it seems to be lacking. The AFM also recognizes this issue: “The financial crisis created 
social and political support for supervision on financial markets. The crisis also contributed to 
the will of market parties to change. As the crisis gets out of sight and the economy picks up 
that support becomes less. The urgency to reach strict legislation has decreased and in the 
United States we see the first signs of deregulation”268. Support for strict supervision and 
legislation is no longer an obvious course of action, which worries the AFM. The issue-attention 
cycle is explained by Anthony Downs in his 1972 article ‘Up and Down with Ecology’.269 He 
describes this issue-attention cycle as a problem that suddenly jumps into public attention, for 
example because of an event, then stays in the public attention for a short amount of time to 
then gradually fade out of the public attention while the issue is largely left unresolved.270 The 
issue-attention cycle consists of five stages: 
(1)  The pre-problem stage; 
(2) Alarmed discovery and euphoric enthusiasm;   
                                                          
267 Ibidem, pp. 34, 36, 50 
268 Autoriteit Financiële Markten. “Toezicht in tijden van verandering: Agenda 2016-2018”, Autoriteit Financiële Markten, 
January, (2016), p. 13 
269 Anthony Downs. "Up and Down with Ecology-The 'Issue-Attention Cycle'", The Public Interest, Vol. 28, (1972), pp. 38-
50. 
270 Ibidem, pp. 38-40 
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(3) Realizing the costs of significant progress;  
(4) Gradual decline of public interest; 
(5) The post-problem state. 
The pre-problem state prevails when something undesirable is going on in society, but the issue 
has not received the attention of the general public yet. This can be indicated as the pre-crisis 
years where financial policy was aimed at increasing the international position of the Dutch 
financial sector by making sure regulation did not limit or hinder the sector in any way. The 
deregulation and perverse incentives resulted in a highly unstable financial system that had to 
bust. When the crisis broke out there usually is a lot of drive and ambition to solve the crisis 
and improve regulation as the policy issue is now at the second phase of the attention cycle. 
Because the public and media are largely involved in the crisis events, the ambition and urgency 
to solve a problem is very high. Furthermore as the immediate harms done are very clear during 
a crisis, the government and other institutions will be very likely to respond.271 Because the 
2007 financial crisis received enormous amounts of attention, also from the general public, the 
issue generally leads to even more negative assessments of financial policy. This creates even 
more pressure on current policy-makers to rethink their dominant policy views and welcome 
policy change, explain Baumgartner and Jones.272 In the third phase of the issue attention cycle, 
Downs states that the public is slowly realizing the enormous costs of policy change. Change 
would not only take an enormous amount of money but would also affect many people for 
example working in the sector or people that used these financial products and credits to 
enhance their own positions. Downs describes that an essential part of this third stage is the 
realisation that (un-)deliberately a group in society is exploited and prevented from using the 
same services or access to wealth and that this is actually preferred by the other group in society. 
When these costs become known and understood and when, in this example, the economy 
slowly improved, the need for heavy regulation was no longer very obvious and the ambition 
to continuously improve regulation on this policy field diminishes. This is also due because the 
interest of the public diminishes, this is stage four in the attention cycle. This point is illustrated 
by the smaller amount of policy actions mentioned in the 2017 coalition agreement and by the 
cautious return to deregulation in the policy field. The final stage in the attention cycle is the 
post-problem state in which the attention strongly decreases and is even replaced by another 
                                                          
271 Thomas A. Birkland. “Focusing Events, Mobilization, and Agenda Setting”, Journal of Public Policy, Vol. 18: 1, 
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272 Frank Baumgartner, Bryan D. Jones, “Agenda and Instability in American Politics” (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1993) 
Roos Majoor, s1737589 
76 
 
issue, for example the refugee crisis that became the new centre of public attention in 2014, 
2015.  
When the urge for reform slows down as public attention diminishes, it might indicate 
that the sector has not learned much out of the crisis. This also illustrates that the vast amount 
of new and improved regulation was also a primary reaction to the crisis. Nevertheless the 
policy field has indeed changed a lot in the post-problem state as a result of the crisis because 
new institutions have been created that have a more permanent character than the attention-
cycle. Like for example the banking union and the European Banking Authority. The 
diminished attention and ambition for further reform that most of the interviewee’s identify in 
the current political and sectoral landscape, is thus rooted in Downs’ theory. As mentioned 
before, the actual learning will not only be a result of policy change but will be reflected by a 
true change in core beliefs about the sector. However as the coalition agreements show, a return 
to market-making coalition framework is slowly happening and neo-liberalism is still very 
preeminent in the sector.  
 In conclusion, when looking at changes in core beliefs and lessons learned from the 
crisis, a couple of dynamics are in place. First of all this thesis has discovered a diminishing of 
blind trust in the financial sector and its corresponding free market belief. The vast amount of 
new regulation and the move towards standardised risk models illustrates this point. The switch 
towards a market-shaping model seems evident. Furthermore the fact that the neo-liberal model 
has been challenged more often indicates a form of change in core beliefs. Moreover all 
interviewee’s have identified clear lessons of the crisis which correspond to the lessons of the 
parliamentary committees. Nonetheless throughout the interviews a clear policy cycle was 
noticeable. The motivation and drive to take regulation further and properly ‘finish’ what was 
started during crisis management seems to be lacking. This is also illustrated by the 2017 
coalition agreement that does not reflect the same urgency to continuously reform the financial 
market as midst crisis agreements, and even moves back to deregulation on some issues. 
Although a change in beliefs about and within the financial sector is cautiously noticeable, a 
true change in core beliefs will probably take even longer to seep through to decision-making 
positions.  
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8. Conclusion and discussion 
This thesis researched to what extent the 2007 financial crisis has led to policy learning in the 
financial sector in the Netherlands. The hypothesis was that this thesis expected to find 
extensive policy learning in the Netherlands because the financial crisis has acted as a trigger 
to rethink policy in this sector. To briefly sum up the evidence, provides the answer to the 
research question. First of all a tremendous amount of policy has indeed changed and tackled 
the problems identified as causes of the crisis. The financial sector was no longer left as a 
laissez-faire market and became more regulated as a result. The links between the solvency of 
governments and the solvency of financial institutions had partially been broken and 
macroprudential supervision had been implemented. Although the majority of new and updated 
regulation came from a higher level of governance, namely the EU or the BCBS, it did not 
greatly hinder learning as the Netherlands gold-plated and took initiatives on several regulatory 
issues. Furthermore the Netherlands was sometimes faster with implementing new regulation 
than the EU and in the example of adding behaviour and culture to the DNB supervisory 
framework the Netherlands is an example for the rest of the EU. The most important policy 
change was the new-found aim for financial stability and customer protection instead of 
freedom for financial institutions and capital flows. On the other hand regulation did not always 
go far enough to truly address policy failures. This is strongly related to the “reform fatigue” 
post-crisis. All interviewee’s seem to agree that the momentum for further and more extensive 
regulation has passed. The interviewee’s identified the issue-attention cycle of regulation, 
where during the crisis the amount of regulation greatly increases, but a tipping point is reached 
where the drive for more profound regulation is less urgent now the economy is recovered. 
Some sources even indicated a move towards deregulation, which might indicate that no 
learning is done as deregulation was identified as one of the causes of the financial crisis.  
 While all informants acknowledged that there had been a financial crisis, what had 
caused the crisis remained debatable. The complexity of the policy problem made the 
tractability of the crisis difficult. Many causes and possible solutions have been mentioned and 
it took a while before consensus grew in the international community. The answers to the 
question of what happened in 2007, still varied greatly among the interviewee’s even ten years 
after the crisis. Even within one organisation different aspects of what happened where 
emphasised by different informants. This indicates that the policy problem was not clearly 
tractable which impedes learning. Because of the intensity and extensive consequences of the 
crisis policy failure was widely recognised. The blame and responsibility question was however 
more difficult to answer. Still, The interviewees from the supervisory authorities and the 
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sectoral actors agreed on shared blame and responsibility for their organisation and recognized 
the lessons they had learned out of the crisis. Strikingly only the political and governmental 
actors laid the responsibility of the crisis at the banking sector and demanded mostly a change 
from these institutions. These actors have likely learned less from the crisis, which is a pity 
when their reactions are exemplary for the majority of the government as they are mainly 
responsible for the creation and execution of policy. Nevertheless the indicated lessons learned 
by all the interviewees show that failing financial policy in the Netherlands had extensively 
been evaluated and assessed. The lessons illustrate the thought process of the actors which 
shows that they have drawn conclusion about the crisis experience they have engaged in. 
Furthermore these lessons have been converted into action. When discussing policy failure, this 
research did not discover much comparisons to other countries or other policy fields, indicating 
more within policy learning by all actors groups, as identified by Sabatier, as opposed to across 
policy field learning as mentioned by Rose.  
When looking at a change in core beliefs about and within the sector, this thesis 
discovered more attention in all actor-groups for views that are divergent from the neo-liberal 
narrative. More academic thinkers, economist and politicians proclaim that a purely laissez-
faire dynamic in the financial sector is not desirable. Especially for the banking sector the notion 
that these institutions have a social responsibility and are not just profit-making firms, was 
emphasised and taken on by the banks. The fact that more innovative ideas about the sector, 
and the revival of older ideas that find their way into current financial policy discussion, show 
that the changing winds are blowing and is a strong indicator of learning. Nevertheless this 
thesis has discovered that the prevalent ideology is still the neo-liberal view, and identifies that 
a real change in ideology or core beliefs is a very slow process. When writing about the ACF, 
Sabatier already warned that the real change of core beliefs is a very difficult process as actors 
are generally reluctant to do so. De Jong of ABN AMRO named himself an example of this, as 
he explained that his lifetime work within a liberal environment, with liberal education and a 
liberal thought framework, makes it very difficult to change these core beliefs, but he welcomes 
the younger generation to change the financial sector. It thus the newer generation that should 
make the changes in core beliefs ‘relatively enduring’. But like Sabatier mentioned, a true 
change in core beliefs is difficult to achieve, hence change will mostly likely take place in the 
secondary aspects of one’s belief system. According to this thesis, the latter is definitely 
identified. All actors groups learned important lessons that had been converted in policy or 
regulation. The importance of macroprudential supervision, the addition of behaviour and 
culture in the supervisory framework, the new founds efforts of banks to put the client first 
Roos Majoor, s1737589 
79 
 
instead of the stakeholder, the increased voicing of ideologies that do not support the dominant 
neo-liberal view, the overall amount of regulation and the switch to the market-shaping 
coalition framework all indicate that secondary learning is present. Even the commercial banks 
have realised that a certain extent of paternalism and clear institutional frameworks are 
necessary to strive towards a safer financial system and to prevent excesses, which is an 
important evolution. Nevertheless if you agree with each other that the government needs to 
create clear governmental frameworks, it is important to think about how these frameworks and 
policies need to be shaped and arranged to coincide in global operating markets and firms. The 
prevention of a race to the bottom is an important challenge, which was shown by for example 
the Brexit which already resulted in a move towards the lowering of standards and deregulation. 
International regulation and cooperation might be the answer for this collective action problem. 
This remains an important question for policy-makers to keep in mind.   
To conclude, the policy problem was poorly tractable, there was a large amount of policy 
change and new regulation which was in general of high quality, policy failure was widely 
identified, blame and responsibility were mostly understood in a shared sense and not by one 
organisation in specific, nevertheless governmental actors strongly avoided blame, external 
financial institutions were not discovered as a main source of neutral and new information by 
all actor groups and the change in beliefs happened mostly at a secondary level. Overall learning 
was identified, but not all indicators, indicated a high probability of learning. In particular, 
learning in commercial banks and supervisory authorities had been extensive. Especially 
because these institutions had forcefully implemented the changed policy into their own 
frameworks and made it their own. Political actors in general practiced too much blame 
avoidance and eluded responsibility to fully learn from the crisis.  
While a lot of possibilities to learn were created and facilitated by the crisis, it remains 
difficult to detect a true alteration of thought about the principles of a policy belief system. This 
thesis has shown that nonetheless a true alteration of core beliefs was set in motion. Sabatier 
identified that learning involved three processes, which were all met by the actors. They namely 
have improved their understanding of the important variables of their belief system, the 
consequences of a laissez-faire system for the sector is an example of this. They refined this 
understanding by learning more about the causal relationships in their belief system and finally 
they have identified the challenges to the belief system and responded to them by for example 
changing policy and their beliefs about the sector. But it might take a while before these changes 
in core beliefs are fully put in place and can be witnessed. It is however a positive thing to have 
discovered that change in the financial sector is slowly being boosted, because this means that 
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the financial sector actors have tried to better understand the world they work in, have evaluated 
the crisis events to better understand the consequences of policy and aim to make better 
decisions for future policy. On a final point, because the evidence of learning indicators and 
changes in the sector point undeniably at some learning in the Dutch financial sector as a result 
of the financial crisis, especially on a secondary level, the null hypothesis, that this research 
finds no policy learning, can be rejected. But in order to discover a true change in core beliefs 
about and within the sector, more research needs to be done in five to ten years to see whether 
these changes have continued and to see whether alternative narratives have been able to 
establish themselves in the sector. It thus remains to be seen if these alteration of thoughts that 
are concerned with the attainment (or revision) of the precepts of a policy belief system were 
enduring enough.  
One actor group that fell out of the scope of this research (and therefore is excluded of 
this thesis’ conclusion about learning), but was mentioned by all interviewee’s, are the 
customers and citizens in the Netherlands. This is the group that, in the end, bought these risky 
products and took out the loans that they could not afford. The AFM emphasised that this group 
does not take the time to get acquainted with the risks they take and the products they buy. It is 
too bluntly stated that it is the responsibility of the consumer, but it seems that this is one group 
has very likely not learned much from the crisis. This was partly included by providing stricter 
regulation on the information provision of clients but even after the 2007 financial crisis, 
customers continued to buy risky and sometimes obscure products at a decent scale. 
Furthermore, because the customer heavily pointed at banks as the source of all problems in the 
financial sector and because the outrage and indignation was very large, it seems like this 
particular group of people failed to take some of the responsibility and diminished their 
probability to learn from the crisis.  
 
8.1 Discussion 
This thesis provided some valuable insights on policy learning in the financial sector in the 
Netherlands. Nevertheless the research has some limitations and room for further research. First 
of all the qualitative method this thesis has chosen comes with certain limitations. Qualitative 
research is difficult to replicate and its outcomes are not easy generalizable.273 However the aim 
of this research was to better understand the dynamics of policy learning in the Dutch financial 
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sector as a result of the financial crisis. The in-depth knowledge this thesis provides is thus a 
valuable addition to the theory and generalization is not its main objective. Nevertheless the 
knowledge gained on policy learning can be projected on the financial sectors of other, similar, 
countries, and the causal inferences this thesis had discovered are broader applicable than just 
the Dutch financial sector. Furthermore the methods and research plan can also be generalizable 
to other researches in the area of policy learning. Moreover the use of process tracing enabled 
this research to make stronger causal inferences than if it just used interview and literature 
review.  
Learning as a policy field too comes with some limitations for its research design. These 
problems are summed up by Radaelli, who identifies the following issues. First he states that 
the null hypothesis, when no learning can be found, is seldom tested. Almost all studies find 
evidence of learning. This is overall true for this thesis as well, although it also found evidence 
of not learning with different actors on different learning indicators. When no learning is found, 
it could indicate a flaw in the measurement of the dependent variable, namely learning. This 
issue was tackled by this thesis by drawing its learning theories from a variety of different 
literature on learning which was peer-reviewed and accepted by the scientific community, and 
by the fact that the notion of not learning from a crisis was taken into account. Because this 
thesis found some evidence that learning did not happen, the measurement of learning is likely 
to be correct. 
The second issue discusses the period over which learning is researched. When learning 
is examined over a shorter period of time, many indicators of learning can be found which have 
not yet come to full realisation. But when learning is considered over the long term, Radaelli 
explains that “it is almost impossible not to ﬁnd instances of learning”274, as government and 
organisations must change, develop and learn when they continuously want to exist in a 
dynamic environment. Sabatier therefor emphasises in his literature on the ACF the importance 
of taking at least a decade to look at policy change and learning.275 This thesis used this 
recommendation to tackle this issue, by taking a timeframe from 2007 to 2017. This provided 
this thesis with enough years to discover real change, and not a too long period in which change 
must be evident, which is reflected in the thesis outcomes. 
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 A third problem that Radaelli indicates with policy learning research design is the 
measurement of learning by the use of qualitative interviewing, as according to him policy-
makers overemphasize the role of learning as opposed to power dynamics within politics.276 
Moreover, learning is sometimes misused by interviewees to protect their organisation from a 
bad reputation. This thesis dealt with this issue by not directly asking the informants about 
policy learning but by processing learning indicators into the interview questions. By indirectly 
asking about learning the overestimation of learning could be prevented, furthermore this thesis 
used literature, debates and statements to complement the interviews. The addition of other 
sources and research methods than just interviews help to overcome the overemphasizing of 
learning in the interviews and the social desirability of information.  
To properly indicate policy learning in the Netherlands, some recommendations for 
further research can be made. As policy learning is quite a broad and multi-layered topic, the 
indicators of policy learning alone could be researched further. For example the concept of 
blame avoidance not only in politics but in financial institutions as well would be an interesting 
addition to the literature as most blame avoidance literature focusses on policy-makers alone. 
Furthermore the role of international financial organisations on national policy making during 
a crisis is another field that is too broad a topic to fully discuss in this thesis. Further research 
on this issue would result in a better understanding of the dynamics between the national 
financial sector and government and international financial organisations. These two additions 
of research would in the end lead to a better understanding of policy learning in the financial 
sector in the Netherlands. Furthermore, as mentioned, learning of customers would be an 
interesting addition to the theoretical field of policy learning as it has been kept out of this 
research’s scope. 
  
 8.1.1 Reflections on learning theory 
Policy learning theory is a strong theory as it provides a clear learning framework with clear 
indicators that can be converted quite evidently into research operationalisation. The concepts 
and variables are clearly explained and it is specified how they relate to each other. Although 
policy learning theory provides the proper framework to analyse whether the actors of a sector 
have profoundly changed, grown and learned as a result of a crisis, it remains hard to truly get 
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to the core of learning within actors, as it is a very subjective and cognitive topic to research. 
This is one of the reasons why Sabatier also attenuates his learning theory to learning in 
secondary belief systems. While this thesis has researched all indicators and used interviews to 
gain in-depth knowledge on the topic, in the end research on this issue can at most scratch the 
surface and hence analyse “physical appearances” of learning. Policy change for example is 
correspondingly an appearance of learning in which the distinction between mere quantity and 
quality is very important, which should be emphasised more in the literature. Learning on a 
secondary level however is equally important as learning in core beliefs. Especially because 
secondary learning, which is about strategies and instruments used to implement those core 
beliefs, is faster established in for example new regulation and hence can have the ability to 
truly change the sector.  
Furthermore this research has been able to tackle most of the limitations associated with 
research on policy learning by combining research methods and by composing a proper 
framework out of multiple literature which was executed in an organized manner. This policy 
learning thesis has come as close as possible to measure learning and provides useful tools to 
build a research design on. The tools thus help indicate the probability of learning. However as 
this thesis has shown, not all indicators have contributed equally to policy learning, but overall 
learning was still identified. The provided neutral information of international financial 
institutions, which turned out to be linked to the tractability of the policy problem, was for 
example was less important for learning in this thesis than the acceptance of policy failure or 
blame avoidance. This illustrates that these different indicators have a weighted quality in 
researching the causal inference of learning. The mutual interconnectedness of learning 
indicators and their weighted qualities could be explored further in the theory.  
This thesis managed to thoughtfully fill the theoretical and empirical gap of policy 
learning as it provides empirical evidence of the causal inferences of policy learning in the 
Dutch financial sector and it uses a proper learning framework. Because this research included 
supervisors and sector officials in the research, it expanded the literature towards the private 
side of learning as the public side of learning was often the main focus in learning theory. 
However in this day and age private parties are heavily included in policy making, hence the 
inclusion of these actors in policy learning is important to truly indicate learning in a certain 
sector. It thus provides a better understanding of a hitherto underexposed topic and the methods 
are used in such a way that they are applicable to generalisation to other learning research.  
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Appendix I: Interview guide 
Interview guide 
 
Name informant: 
Job title: 
Date: 
 
1. According to you, what happened in the financial sector in 2007?  
 
2. Who is to blame? 
 
3. What was the share of the banking sector/government/supervisor in the crisis? 
 
4. How did the banking sector/government/supervisor in general react to the financial 
crisis? (Were committees formed, crisis debates/meetings, research, etc.) 
 
5. What was the most important defect in the Dutch financial sector before the financial 
crisis? Was there consensus about this main defect?  
 
6. How should this defect best be dealt with?  
 
7. Are the current policy changes enough to prevent future crisis from happening or is 
there regulation missing? What regulation is missing? 
 
8. What particular issue did not receive enough attention according to you? 
 
9. What policy lessons could be drawn from the crisis? 
 
10. How does your organisation view the financial sector (as one that should be heavily 
regulated or not etc.)? 
 
11. Did you witness a change in the core beliefs about and within the financial sector with 
your organisation? (concrete examples) 
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12. To what extent did perverse incentives driven by a lack of regulation or the wrong 
regulation play an important part in the financial crisis (for example the extremely 
high bonuses)? 
 
13. Has the culture in the financial sector changed after the financial crisis? (concrete 
examples) 
 
14. Could the crisis have been prevented? By whom/what? 
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Appendix II: Overview of interviews 
 
Interview 1 
Informant: Herwin Loman 
Job title: Senior strategy advisor DNB 
Date: 9 November 2017 
Location: DNB, Amsterdam 
Duration of interview: 1 hour, 2 minutes 
 
Interview 2 
Informant: Dirk Slieker,  
Job title: Political adviser finance, PvdA 
Date: 15 November 2017 
Location: Tweede Kamer (House of 
Representatives), The Hague 
Duration of interview: 30 minutes 
 
Interview 3 
Informant: Supervisor European significant 
banks 
Job title: Supervisor for European 
significant banks DNB 
Date: 20 November 2017 
Location: DNB, Amsterdam 
Duration of interview: 44 minutes 
 
Interview 4 
Informant: Supervisor DNB 
Job title: Supervisor DNB 
Date: 22 November 2017 
Location: DNB, Amsterdam 
Duration of interview: 47 minutes 
 
Interview 5 
Informant: Bouke de Vries 
Job Title: Advisor to the Board, Public 
Affairs at Rabobank 
Date: 23 November 2017 
Location: Rabo Bank, Utrecht 
Duration of interview: 55 minutes 
 
 
 
 
Interview 6 
Informant: Teunis Brosens 
Job title: Senior Economist, Eurozone, 
ING 
Date: 27 November 2017 
Location: ING, Amsterdam 
Duration of interview: 40 minutes 
 
Interview 7 
Informant: Renkse Leijten 
Job title: Politician, SP (member of the 
permanent Chamber Committee on 
Finance, spokesperson finance) 
Date: 6 December 2017  
Location: Tweede Kamer (House of 
Representatives), The Hague 
Duration of interview: 43 minutes 
 
Interview 8 
Informant: Policy officer finance 
Job title: Policy officer finance Political 
party  
Date: 6 December 2017  
Location: via email, Amsterdam  
Duration of interview: not applicable  
 
Interview 9 
Informants: Han de Jong and Hein 
Schotsman 
Job title: Chief Economist ABN AMRO, 
and senior economist and expert banking 
regulation ABN AMRO 
Date: 8 December 2017 
Location: ABN AMRO, Amsterdam 
Duration: 55 minutes 
 
Interview 10 
Informant: Ivo Thijssen 
Job title: Supervisor retail AFM 
Date: 8 December 2017 
Location: AFM, Amsterdam 
Duration: 37 minutes 
 
Roos Majoor, s1737589 
96 
 
Appendix III: Overview indicators of policy learning organised per actor 
Figure 7: Overview indicators of policy learning. 
 
 
Name 
informant: 
Indicators of policy learning 
Identify 
policy 
failure 
Blame 
avoidance 
Do they feel 
responsible? 
Did policy 
change went 
far enough? 
Was the cause 
of the crisis 
identifiable?  
Identifies 
change in 
core beliefs? 
Supervisors 
 
      
Herwin 
Loman 
(DNB) 
Yes; too few 
regulation, 
sometimes 
wrongly 
implemente
d. Moral 
hazard.  
Shared 
blame; 
DNB had 
also made 
mistakes. 
Partly, but 
concurrence of 
different 
circumstances. 
Probably not 
in all policy 
areas. 
Yes; High 
leverage, 
financial 
innovation and 
interconnected
ness. Growth 
in financial 
markets. 
Yes; less 
blind trust in 
markets. 
Supervisor 
for European 
significant 
banks  
(DNB) 
Yes; but you 
cannot 
regulate all 
risks. 
Shared 
blame; 
DNB had 
also made 
mistakes. 
Partly, but 
concurrence of 
different 
circumstances. 
Yes; you 
can’t 
regulate all 
risks. But 
not enough 
on bank size. 
Yes; But  
extremely 
complex and 
no consensus. 
Too much 
trust in risk 
management 
of banks. 
Financial 
innovation. 
Yes, SSM 
more control 
less dialogue 
in 
supervision. 
Supervisor 
(DNB) 
Yes. Shared 
blame; 
DNB had 
also made 
mistakes. 
Partly, but 
concurrence of 
different 
circumstances. 
Yes; don’t 
need more 
regulation. 
But other 
forms of 
supervision. 
More focus 
on business 
models, 
strategy and 
culture. 
Yes; 
Structures in 
financial 
sector that 
have led to 
risky 
behaviour and 
culture. As 
actors don’t 
feel the losses 
themselves. 
Yes; 
importance 
of behaviour 
and culture. 
the one-
sided focus 
on output 
did not 
allow 
supervision 
to signal and 
act in time 
Ivo Thijssen  
(AFM) 
 
Yes. Shared 
blame; 
definitely 
not only 
banks, 
more 
governmen
t.  
AFM not per 
se responsible, 
but shared 
blame for 
crisis. 
No, not 
enough 
attention to 
bank size.  
Yes; private 
parties use the 
playing field 
that they have 
been awarded.  
Established 
financial 
institutions 
yes, 
consumers 
no.  
Political 
actors 
      
Dirk Slieker 
(PvdA) 
Not per se 
policy 
failure, 
more failure 
within the 
sector  
Blame 
avoidance; 
banks were 
the main 
causer. 
No.  No. Yes; origin of 
crisis at banks. 
Too few 
regulation and 
too low 
buffers. 
No. 
Renske 
Leijten (SP) 
Yes; amount 
of 
deregulation 
Not per se 
but points 
at the 
No 
(Opposition 
party). 
No.  Yes; the 
disconnect of 
financial 
No. 
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and 
globalisatio
n 
power of 
the banks. 
products and 
its real value. 
Securitization. 
Policy 
officer 
finance 
(political 
party) 
Yes; 
framework 
in which 
sector may 
operate 
were not 
adequately 
outlined. 
Shared 
blame, also 
point at 
consumers, 
and the 
sector. 
Yes, also 
responsibility 
for the 
government. 
No; stricter 
control on 
the 
outstanding 
risks on 
bank balance 
sheets 
Yes. 
Securitization 
of mortgages. 
Burst of 
housing 
bubble and 
contagion 
Yes.  
Commercial 
banks 
      
Bouke de 
Vries (Rabo) 
Not one 
clear culprit 
that stands 
out as policy 
failure. 
Several 
weakness in 
the system 
and in 
regulation 
have been 
revealed 
 
Shared 
blame. 
Banks were 
partly 
responsible 
but also 
government 
supervisor and 
consumer. 
Both; on 
some issues 
too far, some 
not far 
enough. 
Yes; but no 
consensus. 
Securitization 
of mortgages, 
giving out 
loans to un- 
creditworthy. 
Yes, but 
differs per 
sector. 
Banks yes, 
public no, 
politics yes. 
Teunis 
Brosens 
(ING) 
Yes; 
regulation is 
what you 
have to do 
but is not 
the whole 
picture.  
Shared 
blame. 
Banks were 
partly 
responsible 
but also 
government 
supervisor and 
consumer. 
Yes. Yes; credit 
bubble in U.S. 
in sub-prime 
channels. 
Now 
consensus but 
it took a while. 
Yes.  
Han de Jong 
& 
Hein 
Schotsman 
(ABN 
AMRO) 
 
Yes; too 
much 
deregulation
. 
Shared 
blame, also 
point at 
consumers, 
supervisor, 
and 
regulator. 
Banks are 
epicentre of 
the crisis but 
also 
government 
supervisor and 
consumer also 
responsible.  
Yes; but also 
too much 
regulation 
which can be 
contra-
productive.  
Yes; many 
different 
aspects at 
play. Errors of 
credit rating 
agencies, 
deregulation, 
profit eager 
public 
Sceptical; it 
is possible 
but very 
slow and 
difficult 
process. 
Crisis is in 
also in the 
nature.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
